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MANDATING DISCLOSURE OF CLIMATERELATED FINANCIAL RISK
Madison Condon, Sarah Ladin, Jack Lienke,
Michael Panfil & Alexander Song

Climate change presents grave risk across the U.S. economy,
including to corporations, their investors, the markets in which
they operate, and the American public at large. Unlike other
financial risks, however, climate risk is not routinely disclosed to
the public. Insufficient corporate disclosures have persisted
despite the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”)
issuance of regulatory guidance on the topic, the emergence of
voluntary disclosure frameworks and standards, and growing
calls from major investors for improved disclosure.
Given the inadequacy of the current regime, the SEC should take
further action to fulfill its statutory mandate to protect investors
and promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
Specifically, the Commission should issue new, mandatory
disclosure regulations that will yield comparable, specific, and
decision-useful climate risk information.
This Article makes process-oriented recommendations relevant to
the development of mandatory climate risk disclosure rules. The
Commission should draw on existing frameworks and standards
in crafting new regulations. The Commission should also draw on
climate-related expertise at other federal agencies through
interagency working groups. Finally, the SEC should increase its
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own expertise in this area by conducting economic research on
climate risk through its Division of Economic and Risk Analysis.
Taken together, these actions will facilitate informed investing,
sustainable growth, and a more resilient economy.
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INTRODUCTION
The effects of anthropogenic climate change are
unprecedented: the global average surface temperature of the planet is
rising at a faster rate than in any other period of human history,
shifting weather patterns in unfamiliar and potentially disastrous
ways.1 These changes will profoundly affect the institutions that
undergird modern society and will challenge almost every industry
and economic sector. Yet most publicly traded companies in the
United States do not disclose sufficient information about the risks
that climate change poses to their assets and operations. Rather,
corporate disclosure of climate risk is often incomplete or nonexistent.
This state of play leaves actors across the financial space
vulnerable. When relevant information is obscured or of low quality,
lenders and shareholders cannot effectively allocate capital, regulators
cannot exercise effective oversight, and companies themselves cannot
proactively manage foreseeable threats to their financial health. As a
result, our wider financial system is also inadequately prepared to
account for the significant risks posed by climate change.2 Experts
have warned that continued complacency could lead to a “climate
1

Raphael Neukom, Nathan Steiger, Juan José Gómez-Navarro, Jianghao Wang &
Johannes P. Werner, No Evidence for Globally Coherent Warm and Cold Periods over
the Preindustrial Common Era, 571 NATURE 550, 550 (2019); Raphael Neukom, Luis
A. Barboza, Michael P. Erb, Feng Shi, Julien Emile-Geay, Michael N. Evans, Jörg
Franke, Darrell S. Kaufman, Lucie Lücke, Kira Rehfeld, Andrew Schurer, Feng Zhu,
Stefan Brönnimann, Gregory J. Hakim, Benjamin J. Henley, Fredrik Charpentier
Ljungqvist, Nicholas McKay, Veronika Valler & Lucine von Gunten, Consistent
Multidecadal Variability in Global Temperature Reconstructions and Simulations over
the Common Era, 12 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 643, 646 (2019); Chelsea Harvey, Current
Warming Is Unparalleled in the Past 2,000 Years, SCI. AM. (July 25, 2019),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/current-warming-is-unparalleled-in-thepast-2-000-years/ [https://perma.cc/4DHF-XEBS].
2 Climate Change and Artificial Intelligence Seen as Risks to Investment Asset
Allocation, Finds New Report by BNY Mellon Investment, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 16, 2019,
8:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/press-releases/2019-09-16/climate-changeand-artificial-intelligence-seen-as-risks-to-investment-asset-allocation-finds-newreport-by-bny-mellon-investm [https://perma.cc/3HSJ-3CZM].
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bubble” that, upon bursting, would send shockwaves through the
economy, resulting in another financial crisis on the scale of the Great
Recession.3 For these reasons, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Climate-Related Market Risk Subcommittee issued a
report (the “CFTC Report”) concluding that climate change “poses a
major risk to the stability of the U.S. financial system and to its ability
to sustain the American economy.”4 To avoid this result, many U.S.
federal, state and municipal agencies must take a variety of actions to
improve the financial system’s integration of and resilience to climate
risk.5
This Article focuses on one agency that will play a major role
in addressing the problem: the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”).6 New regulations are needed to bring the
quality of climate risk disclosures level with other forms of risk
disclosure commonly required of publicly traded companies.7 The
SEC, as the primary regulator of American securities markets, should
mandate that publicly traded companies disclose their climate risk in a
manner that is comparable, specific, and decision-useful. This
improved disclosure regime will help remedy the vulnerabilities
identified above: lenders and shareholders can draw from the
disclosures to make informed investment decisions; regulators can
more appropriately identify risk and monitor compliance; and
companies can consider and mitigate revealed threats. On an
economy-wide level, such a regime will help asset prices reflect all
relevant information; accurate pricing, in turn, will help investors
allocate capital to its risk-adjusted, highest-value use. These
improvements in disclosure and risk assessment will mitigate the risks

Rostin Behnam, Comm’r, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Opening Statement
of Commissioner Rostin Behnam Before the Market Risk Advisory Committee (June
12, 2019), https://perma.cc/C37G-497S.
4 COMMODITY F UTURES TRADING C OMM’N CLIMATE-R ELATED MARKET RISK
SUBCOMM. OF THE MARKET RISK ADVISORY COMM., MANAGING CLIMATE RISK IN THE
U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM i (2020), https://perma.cc/UT9M-FG2Y [hereinafter “CFTC
REPORT”].
5 See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Instituting Proceedings in the Matter
Regarding the Need for Reporting Risks Related to Climate Change, Case 20-M-0499
(Oct. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/459N-PTJY.
6
While this Article focuses exclusively on action that the SEC should take, we
recognize that there is a much broader set of regulators that can and should take steps
to identify and mitigate climate risk. A more holistic approach would, for example,
include activity by the Financial Stability Oversight Council or the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission.
7 While this Article focuses on the need and authority for new regulations under existing
statutes, new legislation related to climate risk disclosure has also been proposed. See,
e.g., Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2019, H.R. 3623, 116th Cong. (2019).
3
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of a “climate bubble” and the significant financial losses that would
accompany its bursting.
The SEC already requires corporations to regularly disclose
material financial risks in certain categories and has issued guidance
acknowledging that climate risk is both material and fits within those
categories under some circumstances. However, despite this guidance
and the increasing popularity of voluntary climate risk disclosure
frameworks and standards, most corporate climate risk disclosures
contain incomplete information and/or boilerplate language that does
not enable investors to make meaningful comparisons across
companies. Accordingly, this Article details the need for new,
mandatory disclosure requirements and makes recommendations for
crafting them. Section II surveys the climate-related risks that
corporations will face in the coming century. Section III provides an
overview of the existing climate risk disclosure regime, including the
SEC’s current regulatory requirements and voluntary disclosure
frameworks developed by non-governmental organizations. Section
IV considers why current regimes have not resulted in comparable,
specific, and decision-useful disclosure. Section V explores the
benefits of improved climate risk disclosure, including for
corporations, investors, markets, and society. Finally, Section VI
recommends steps that the SEC should take in the near term to
facilitate its promulgation of new, mandatory climate risk disclosure
standards—namely, conducting research to increase institutional
expertise on climate risk, coordinating with other agencies, and
drawing on best practices from existing climate risk disclosure
frameworks.8 Section VII concludes.
I.
UNDERSTANDING AND IDENTIFYING CLIMATE RISK
Climate-related financial risk comes in a variety of forms but is
generally considered to fall into two broad categories: physical risk
and transition risk. Physical risk refers to the ways in which climate
change-amplified and -altered weather patterns can affect corporate
assets and operations. Transition risk arises from climate changedriven shifts in public policy, technology, or the market.9 These risks,
8 After this Article went to press, the SEC proposed a set of mandatory climate
risk disclosure requirements. We do not address the substance of that proposal.
9
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, FINAL REPORT:
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES 5–6
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and examples of how they affect various sectors of the U.S. economy,
are discussed in detail below.
A. Physical Risk
Physical risk encompasses the harmful effects of climate
change on a corporation’s physical assets and operations. These harms
can stem from either acute weather events, like hurricanes, or
changing baseline conditions, like rising seas,10 and can encompass
both direct economic impacts, such as the cost of repairing a damaged
facility, and indirect impacts, such as increased insurance premiums
for the facility following its repair.11 The financial implications of
physical climate risk are massive. The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration estimates that the United States has
already experienced over $500 billion in direct economic costs and
damages from extreme weather events since 2015.12 In 2020 alone,
there were twenty-two “billion dollar weather events”—extreme
weather events that have caused over $1 billion each in direct
(2017) [https://perma.cc/QR9J-3636] [hereinafter “TCFD REPORT”]; BLACKROCK,
GETTING PHYSICAL: SCENARIO ANALYSIS FOR ASSESSING CLIMATE-RELATED RISKS 7
(2019), https://perma.cc/3J5C-7DK6; COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., IMPACT OF CLIMATE
RISK ON THE ENERGY SYSTEM: EXAMINING THE FINANCIAL, SECURITY, AND
TECHNOLOGY DIMENSIONS 46 (2019), https://perma.cc/DAZ7-GFRC [hereinafter “CFR
REPORT”].
10 See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., ADVANCING TCFD GUIDANCE
ON PHYSICAL CLIMATE RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES 3 (2018), https://perma.cc/5R6T3EDY; TCFD REPORT, supra note 9, at 6. Impacts of changing baseline conditions are
often referred to as “chronic physical risks.” Id.
11 LEE REINERS & CHARLIE WOWK, CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE LAB, CLIMATE RISK
DISCLOSURES & PRACTICES: HIGHLIGHTING THE NEED FOR A STANDARDIZED
REGULATORY DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK TO WEATHER IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON
FINANCIAL MARKETS 15 (2020) [https://perma.cc/H44E-C7TG] [hereinafter
“DISCLOSURE LAB REPORT”]. This may also include growing risk to the ability of
corporations to obtain financing by “damaging assets that serve as collateral for loans
or that underpin other investments.” Id. at 15–16.
12 Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Summary Stats, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/summary-stats/US/2020
(last visited June 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/57XB-638E]. For more information on the
economic impacts of climate change in the United States, see Solomon Hsiang, Robert
Kopp, Amir Jina, James Rising, Michael Delgado, Sashank Mohan, D. J. Rasmussen,
Robert Muir-Wood, Paul Wilson, Michael Oppenheimer, Kate Larsen & Trevor
Houser, Estimating Economic Damage from Climate Change in the United States, 356
SCI. 1362, 1362 (2017) [https://perma.cc/UN9D-PRYS]. The Climate Impact Lab has
also created a Climate Impact Map that provides information on how climate will
impact regions of the U.S. differently under various climate projections, using countylevel
data.
See
Climate
Impact
Map,
CLIMATE
IMPACT
LAB,
http://www.impactlab.org/map/#usmeas=absolute&usyear=19812010&gmeas=absolute&gyear=1986-2005
(last
visited
June
26,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/9NGM-DF6E].
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economic damage—totaling $95 billion in damages.13 Though already
staggering, these estimates understate the magnitude of physical risk
because they do not account for indirect impacts such as increased
costs of financing or insurance premiums, or for costs arising from
changes in baseline climate conditions rather than acute weather
events.14
All U.S. regions and industries face physical climate risk, but
each will experience it differently.15 The chemical industry, for
example, is especially vulnerable to extreme weather events given that
significant assets are located on coasts and waterways, particularly on
the Gulf Coast.16 These impacts are not theoretical. For instance, in
2017, Hurricane Harvey resulted in massive flooding of Arkema’s
Crosby Facility in Houston.17 This caused its primary and backup
power systems to go offline, preventing cooling of liquid organic
peroxides, which exploded as a result.18 Research has demonstrated
that climate change made rainfall from Hurricane Harvey more likely
and more intense.19

Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Overview, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN.,
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/overview
[https://perma.cc/GQR2-JBSK] (last visited June 26, 2021); NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 12. Direct economic impacts include physical
damage to private and public structures and assets, business interruptions, disaster
restoration costs, and more, both insured and uninsured. Billion-Dollar Disasters:
Calculating
the
Costs,
NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/monitoring-references/dyk/billions-calculations
[https://perma.cc/78UA-2M3E] (last visited June 26, 2021).
14 These estimates also do not consider “losses to natural capital or assets, health care
related losses, or values associated with lost life.” Billion-Dollar Disasters, supra note
13.
15 See, e.g., Al Shaw, Abrahm Lustgarten & Jeremy W. Goldsmith, New Climate Maps
Show a Transformed United States, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 15, 2020),
https://projects.propublica.org/climate-migration/ [https://perma.cc/D67M-HATV].
16
A recent study identified 872 hazardous chemical facilities located on the Gulf Coast
alone. Susan C. Anenberg & Casey Kalman, Extreme Weather, Chemical Facilities,
and Vulnerable Communities in the U.S. Gulf Coast: A Disastrous Combination, 3
GEOHEALTH 122, 122 (2019); see also Zoe Schlanger, We Placed Our Chemical Plants
Near Waterways. That Used to Make Sense. Now It’s a Hazard, QUARTZ (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://perma.cc/KG6L-CYT3.
17 Harris County’s Original Petition and Application for Permanent Injunction at 8–9,
Harris County, Texas v. Arkema, Inc., No. 2017-7691 (157th Tx. Judicial D. Nov. 16,
2017).
18 Id at 9.
19 E.g., Geert Jan van Oldenborgh, Karin van der Wiel, Antonia Sebastian, Roop Singh,
Julie Arrighi, Friederike Otto, Karsten Haustein, Sihan Li, Gabriel Vecchi & Heide
Cullen, Attribution of Extreme Rainfall from Hurricane Harvey, August 2017, 12 ENV’T
RSCH. LETTERS 1, 10 (2017) [https://perma.cc/P2B3-JSXM] (finding that climate
13
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Corporations will also face challenges arising from changes in
baseline weather conditions. The agricultural industry appears more
vulnerable to temperature increases: in the Southwest, productivity of
outdoor labor is expected to decrease by five to seven percent by
2100.20 Changing precipitation and evaporation patterns further
threaten the industry. Agricultural supply chains may be disrupted, for
example, when rivers have too much or too little water to safely
support barge traffic carrying crops, seeds, and other materials.21
The real estate industry, too, faces a variety of physical
risks—with massive implications for property values. Rising seas and
flooding could devalue exposed homes by $30 to $80 billion in
Florida,22 while climate-intensified wildfires could wipe out $2 trillion
in property values in California.23
change made rainfall from Hurricane Harvey three times more likely and 15% more
intense); Mark D. Risser & Michael F. Wehner, Attributable Human-Induced Changes
in the Likelihood and Magnitude of the Observed Extreme Precipitation During
Hurricane Harvey, 44 GEOPHYSICAL RSCH. LETTERS 12,457, 12,457 (2017)
[https://perma.cc/9AMD-PW8U] (finding precipitation was likely increased by at least
18.8% due to climate change).
20 CERES, ADDRESSING CLIMATE AS A SYSTEMIC RISK: A CALL TO ACTION FOR U.S.
FINANCIAL REGULATORS 6 (2020) [https://perma.cc/U6HK-2QQW] (citing ENV’T
PROT. AGENCY, CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES: BENEFITS OF GLOBAL ACTION
28 (2015) [https://perma.cc/6PZ5-487N]).; see also CFTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 13
(finding “general agreement that climate change will reduce average yields and total
production for most crops in most regions”); Climate Change and Agriculture: A
Perfect Storm in Farm Country, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/climate-change-and-agriculture
[https://perma.cc/YA3N-XTCF].
21 CFTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 21.
22 Jonathan Woetzel, Dickson Pinner, Hamid Samandari, Hauke Engel, Mekala
Krishnan, Claudia Kampel & Marlies Vasmel, Will Mortgages and Markets Stay Afloat
in
Florida,
MCKINSEY
GLOBAL
INST.
(Apr.
27,
2020),
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/willmortgages-and-markets-stay-afloat-in-florida [https://perma.cc/KAY7-GZCQ]; see
also UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, UNDERWATER: RISING SEAS, CHRONIC FLOODS,
AND
THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR US COASTAL REAL ESTATE 2 (2018)
[https://perma.cc/2BVT-6VYJ] (concluding that more than 300,000 coastal homes with
a market value of $117.5 billion today are at risk of “chronic inundation in 2045” and
that properties worth more than $1 trillion could be at risk by 2100).
In 2019, the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank published a series of articles on
climate risk, some of which discussed the concept of “blue-lining,” a practice where
lenders refuse to authorize loans for the purchase of homes in locations with
unacceptable flood risk. See Michael D. Berman, Flood Risk and Structural Adaptation
of Markets, CMTY. DEV. INNOVATION REV.: STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE
RISK IN LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME CMTYS, Oct. 2019 at 13, 16.
23 Ceres, supra note 20, at 8 (citing Yaling Jiang, Wildfires Might Erase $2 Trillion
Worth of Housing Value in California, BARRON’S (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/wildfires-might-erase-2-trillion-worth-of-housing-
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Physical risk varies widely not only across sectors, but also
across corporations within sectors.24 Each corporation will experience
different damages depending on the type and location of its physical
assets, infrastructure, and workers, as well as those of its supply chain
partners.25 For example, the energy industry has already experienced
significant physical effects across regions from a variety of climate
change impacts. In the Gulf Coast, the sector has encountered
significant damage from climate-amplified flooding and hurricanes.
Houston-based Occidental Petroleum alone suffered $70 million in
pre-tax income reduction due to Hurricane Harvey.26 Twelve years
prior, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita cost the energy industry $15

value-in-california-01572882115 (discussing Redfin report analyzing total value of
homes at risk of wildfires)).
24 E.g., Rick Lord, Steven Bullock & Murray Birt, Understanding Climate Risk at the
Asset Level: The Interplay of Transition and Physical Risk, S&P GLOBAL,
https://www.spglobal.com/_division_assets/images/special-editorial/understandingclimate-risk-at-the-asset-level/sp-trucost-interplay-of-transition-and-physical-riskreport-05a.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8VN-87AC] (last visited Dec. 21, 2020) (“Company
exposure and resilience to both transition and physical risk does not conform to clear
sectoral patterns, highlighting the need for in-depth analysis to evaluate climate risk at
the asset and company level.”); see also BLACKROCK, supra note 9 (demonstrating how
physical risk for sectors can vary across regions).
25 Physical risk may pose significant concern for corporations whose supply chains
involve international actors. For example, the U.S. imports over 90% of its rare earth
minerals from China, and these minerals are used to manufacture a wide array of goods,
including memory cards, X-ray machines, magnets, catalytic converters, batteries, and
cell phones. June Teufel Dreyer, China’s Monopoly on Rare Earth Elements—and Why
We Should Care, FOREIGN POL’Y RSCH. INST. (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/10/chinas-monopoly-on-rare-earth-elements-andwhy-we-should-care/ [https://perma.cc/6LEQ-PZGR]; see also What Are ‘Rare Earths’
Used For?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 13, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-17357863
[https://perma.cc/Q2HG-G4LY]. The regions that produce these minerals, however,
have been subject to increasing rates of extreme rainfall, which in turn has increased
the risk and severity of landslides, preventing extraction of the necessary materials. The
probability of a severe disruption in rare earths production is estimated to double or
triple by 2030, placing the supply chains for all of these goods at risk. Jonathan Woetzel,
Dickon Pinner, Hamid Samandari, Hauke Engel, Mekela Krishnan, Claudia Kampel &
Jakob Graabak, Could Climate Become the Weak Link in Your Supply Chain,
MCKINSEY GLOB. INST. (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/businessfunctions/sustainability/our-insights/could-climate-become-the-weak-link-in-yoursupply-chain, [https://perma.cc/HG44-8QTZ].
26 CFR REPORT, supra note 9, at 27. Indeed, Houston, home to significant energy sector
infrastructure, has seen three 1-in-500-year flooding events since 2015. Id. at 35.
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billion.27 With hurricanes growing in severity and reach,28 stormrelated impacts in this region are only expected to increase.29
On the East Coast, the energy sector likewise faces a variety
of emerging challenges. Rising sea levels put place-bound assets at
risk, as New York City utility Consolidated Edison (“ConEd”)
highlighted in a 2019 vulnerability study finding that flood heights in
ConEd’s service territory are projected to increase from 8.3 feet to
13.3 feet by 2100 due to sea level rise, exposing more of its
substations to frequent flooding damage.30 Sea level rise and storm
surge have also been raised as concerns for nuclear facilities, like
Florida Power & Light’s (“FPL”) existing and planned nuclear
reactors at its Turkey Point Facility in southern Florida.31 During one
licensing hearing for two new nuclear reactors, a Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (“NRC”) Commissioner raised concerns that FPL used a
one foot sea level rise estimate in its design basis, while the National
Climate Assessment and other projects suggest sea level rise in south
Florida could reach six feet by 2100.32
Increased drought and longer and more severe heatwaves also
pose risk to the energy sector. With respect to drought, CDP (formerly
known as Carbon Disclosure Project) conducted a survey of twenty
energy companies and found that they had already experienced waterrelated disruptions to their operations totaling $1.8 billion in revenue

27

Id.
See ROGER R. GRENIER, PETER SOUSOUNIS, JON SCHNEYER & D AN RAIZMAN, AIR,
QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT FROM CLIMATE CHANGE ON U.S. HURRICANE RISK (2020),
https://www.verisk.com/contentassets/307844382ae24e3c9aa9ed4d8d714f60/air_clim
atechange_us_hurricane_whitepaper.pdf ; see also James P. Kossin, Kenneth R. Knapp,
Timothy L. Olander & Christopher S. Velden, Global Increase in Major Tropical
Cyclone Exceedance Probability Over the Past Four Decades, 117 PNAS 11975 (2020)
[https://perma.cc/3GP2-TS2Z].
29 Lin Li & Panaki Chakraborty, Slower Decay of Landfalling Hurricanes in a Warming
World, 587 NATURE 230, 230 (2020).
30 CONSOLIDATED EDISON, CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY STUDY 3, 47 (2019).
31 See, e.g., Transcript at 121–33, Hearing on Combined Licenses for Turkey Point,
Units 6 & 7, No. 52-040-COL (Dec. 12, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3VYU-PYKE] (NRC
mandatory hearing on combined license application); Memorandum and Order (Ruling
on Petitions to Intervene) at 72 n.78, Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Units 6
& 7), LBP-11-06, (Feb. 28, 2011) (Nos. 52-040-COL and 52-041- COL)
[https://perma.cc/HHD8-WE4D] (discussing cumulative impacts of sea level rise
contention and potential for claims of climate-related design basis flaws).
32 Transcript at 121–33, Hearing on Combined Licenses for Turkey Point, Units 6 & 7,
No. 52-040-COL (Dec. 12, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3VYU-PYKE] (questioning by
NRC Commissioner Baran regarding decision to use a sea level rise estimate at the low
end of the National Climate Assessment’s predictions). For a broad assessment of the
physical risk to electric utility generation assets on a risk-by-risk, plant-by-plant basis,
see BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 17.
28
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loss due to water scarcity in 2017 alone.33 Moody’s Investor Service
has also raised alarm over climate-related water scarcity for utilities,
noting early closures of fossil fuel plants could become necessary in
drought-prone areas like New Mexico.34 As for heat events, in
California, a one-in-thirty five year heat storm caused grid operators to
engage in rotating outages in summer 2020.35 And in New York,
ConEd’s vulnerability study found that by 2050 its assets could
experience up to twenty-three days per year where temperatures
exceed 95°F and twenty-six days where the heat index equals or
exceeds 103°F.36 These increased temperatures will result in decreased
capacity of ConEd’s assets, which were designed to operate in lower
temperatures.37 ConEd also reported worker safety concerns due to
high heat and the need to increase its HVAC capacity by eleven
percent by 2080.38
A. Transition Risk
Corporations are likely to incur substantial costs not only from
climate change’s physical effects, but also from the actions that
society takes in response to those physical effects, such as the
adoption of new limits on greenhouse gas emissions or the increase in
demand for sustainable products.39 This category of risk, commonly
known as transition risk, is often divided into several, sometimes
overlapping and compounding subcategories, including: policy and
legal risk; technology risk; market risk; and reputational risk.40 These
subcategories are discussed below.

CFR REPORT, supra note 9, at 26 (citing CDP’s survey).
See Mike Hughlett, Moody’s Gives Xcel ‘Red Flag’ for Water Stress Because of
Climate Change in Southwest States, STAR TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.startribune.com/moody-s-gives-xcel-red-flag-for-water-stress-becauseof-climate-change-in-southwest-states/567212732ROMANY WEBB, MICHAEL PANFIL &
SARAH LADIN, CLIMATE RISK IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR: LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO
ADVANCE CLIMATE RESILIENCE PLANNING BY ELECTRIC UTILITIES 21 (2020)
[https://perma.cc/2VU4-26QC] (citing Kavya Balaraman, Water Scarcity Accelerates
Plans to Close Xcel’s Tolk Coal Plant by a Decade, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/xcel-energy-plans-shutter-tolk-coal-plant2032/570456/ [https://perma.cc/YQ7E-2K3R]).
35
CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N & CAL. ENERGY COMM’N,
PRELIMINARY ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS: MID-AUGUST 2020 HEAT STORM 5 (2020)
[https://perma.cc/2KV2-K76D].
36 CONSOLIDATED EDISON, supra note 30, at 3.
37 Id. at 4.
38 Id.
39 TCFD REPORT, supra note 9, at 5.
40 Id. at 5–6.
33
34
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Policy and Legal Risk

Corporations will face policy risk as governments take action
on climate. This aspect of transition risk “stems from the uncertainty
surrounding agreements, rules, and regulations that address
transitioning to a low- or net-zero-carbon economy.”41 In the U.S.,
both state and federal policy changes are likely to significantly affect
corporate assets and operations. At the state level, twenty-nine states
and the District of Columbia have already established target dates by
which electric utilities must provide a set proportion of electricity
from renewable or clean energy sources.42 The prevalence and
aggressiveness of these targets has increased in recent years, and
fifteen states now aim to achieve one hundred percent clean or
renewable energy by 2050 or earlier.43 At the federal level, President
Biden has pledged to implement policies to transition the nation to
carbon-free electricity generation by 2035, establish greenhouse gas
and new fuel economy standards for motor vehicles, and support tax
incentives and new finance mechanisms for clean energy.44 While the
economic impacts of these state and federal policies fall most directly
on the energy and automotive sectors, their effects are also felt
throughout the broader economy.45

41

CFR REPORT, supra note 9, at 46.
U.S. State Electricity Portfolio Standards, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
https://www.c2es.org/document/renewable-and-alternate-energy-portfolio-standards/
[https://perma.cc/7ZP9-RYP6] (last updated Nov. 2019).
43 Spencer Fields, 100 Percent Renewable Targets, ENERGY SAGE (May 2, 2019),
https://news.energysage.com/states-with-100-renewable-targets/
[https://perma.cc/9X9W-TUBJ]; Sophia Ptacek, Race to 100% Clean, NAT. RES. DEF.
COUNCIL
(Dec.
2,
2020),
https://www.nrdc.org/resources/race-100-clean
[https://perma.cc/255V-A7BV].
44 The Biden Plan to Build a Modern, Sustainable Infrastructure and an Equitable
Clean Energy Future, BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/clean-energy/
[https://perma.cc/2T8G-SKDH] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020). While the Biden
Administration may face hurdles to enacting portions of his climate plan without new
legislation, President Biden can use the existing authority of federal agencies to take
action on climate. See, e.g., Umair Irfan, How Joe Biden Plans to Use Executive Powers
to Fight Climate Change, VOX (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.vox.com/21549521/climatechange-senate-election-joe-biden; Anna M. Phillips, Five Things Joe Biden Can Do to
Fight Climate Change—Without Congress’ Help, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2020, 3:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-11-08/five-things-joe-biden-can-do-tofight-climate-change-without-congress-help.
45
These types of policies can have implications throughout supply chains by changing
the costs of and supply and demand of goods and services. See, e.g., Commission
Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290, 6291
(Feb. 8, 2010) [hereinafter “2010 Climate Disclosure Guidance”] (noting corporations
may seek to reflect carbon price in goods).
42
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Corporations will also face new litigation risk resulting from
lawsuits related to corporations’ failures to mitigate their climate
impacts, adapt to climate change, or sufficiently disclose material
financial risks.46 The fossil fuel industry and adjacent corporations
have faced a substantial increase in lawsuits over the past decade—a
more than five-fold increase from the number of cases brought against
companies in the 2000s.47 Litigation could present a significant
financial liability for any company that fails to address new hazards
caused by climate change. For example, in 2019, Pacific Gas &
Electric (“PG&E”) estimated that it faced $30 billion in liabilities for
its role in climate change-amplified wildfires.48 The California Public
Utilities Commission ultimately imposed a civil penalty of over $2
billion,49 and, in PG&E’s bankruptcy proceedings following the fires,
the court approved a $13.5 billion settlement with wildfire victims.50
PG&E is not unique—one analysis of seventeen energy companies
estimated that they could face liabilities of $58 to $107 billion
annually, amounting to between five and twenty percent of the
companies’ pretax earnings.51 While the energy sector is already
encountering an array of climate-related suits,52 corporations in other

46

TCFD REPORT, supra note 9, at 5.
See generally U.S. Climate Change Litigation Database, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE L. AT COLUM. L. SCH., http://climatecasechart.com/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
48 Steven Mufson, Inside a California Utility: Mandatory Blackouts Amid Wildfire
Threats and Bankruptcy, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2019, 8:19 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/inside-pgandes-choicesblackouts-and-the-threat-of-wildfires/2019/12/21/868d58e8-107c-11ea-9cd7a1becbc82f5e_story.html; Ivan Penn, Lauren Hepler & Peter Eavis, PG&E Reaches
$13.5 Billion Deal with Wildfire Victims, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/06/business/energy-environment/pge-wildfirevictims-deal.html.
49
Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Investigation 19-06-015: Decision Approving Proposed
Settlement Agreement with Modifications, at 2 (May 7, 2020) [https://perma.cc/FF3M98JH].
50
Peg Brickley, PG&E Wins Court Approval of $13.5 Billion Deal with Wildfire
Victims, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2019, 8:51 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-ewins-court-approval-of-13-5-billion-deal-with-wildfire-victims-11576633923
[https://perma.cc/24SN-QJ2T].
51 Cristina Spano, Guilty by Emission: Courtrooms Are the New Battleground for
Climate Activism, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.economist.com/specialreport/2020/09/17/guilty-by-emission [https://perma.cc/VF8U-GMCF].
52 For a thorough discussion of claims against the energy industry, see WEBB ET AL.,
supra note 34, at 27–30.
47
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sectors could also face liability if they fail to disclose and manage the
risks of climate change to their business.53
ii.

Technology Risk

Technological changes also create transition risk.
Technological innovation affects corporations’ competitiveness, their
production and distribution costs, and their revenue streams as
demand for their products and services changes.54 These changes are
particularly salient in the context of climate change, as technological
innovation is increasingly resulting in novel zero-carbon products and
services. The American coal industry, for example, has seen a sharp
decline in production as cleaner energy alternatives like wind and
solar—now coupled with advanced technology like energy storage—
have become more affordable alternatives.55 Outside of the energy
sector, substitution of products or services with lower emissions
options is increasing as well. For example, the development of new
plant-based or other meat-alternative products, and lab-cultured meat
as a substitute for factory-farmed meats, could pose risk to the
industry as consumers look to limit their consumption of highly
carbon-intensive meats.56
iii. Market and Reputational Risk
Finally, transition risk includes market risk that results from
changes in the supply of and demand for products and services.57 On
53

For a discussion of corporate director fiduciary duties and their intersection with
climate risk, see Lisa Benjamin, The Road to Paris Runs Through Delaware: Climate
Change Litigation and Directors’ Duties, 2 UTAH L. REV. 313 (2020)
[https://perma.cc/AMW6-QMLJ].
54 TCFD REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.
55 Fred Pearce, As Investors Back Away, the Economics of Coal Turn Toxic,
YALEENVIRONMENT360 (Mar. 10, 2020), https://e360.yale.edu/features/as-investorsand-insurers-back-away-the-economics-of-coal-turn-toxic
[https://perma.cc/6M253MES].
56 See, e.g., Julia B. Olayanju, Plant-Based Meat Alternatives: Perspectives on
Consumer Demands and Future Directions, FORBES (July 30, 2019, 12:07 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/juliabolayanju/2019/07/30/plant-based-meatalternatives-perspectives-on-consumer-demands-and-futuredirections/?sh=535cd73d6daa [https://perma.cc/52RV-YWFN]; Our Meatless Future:
How the $2.7T Global Meat Market Gets Disrupted, CBINSIGHTS (July 15, 2020),
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/future-of-meat-industrial-farming/
[https://perma.cc/V7EZ-9U6Y]; Agnieszka de Sousa, Lab-Grown Meat Is Getting
Closer to Supermarket Shelves, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2020, 7:01 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-10/lab-meat-is-getting-closer-tosupermarket-shelves [https://perma.cc/7S3F-8W3R].
57 TCFD REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.
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the supply side, climate change can increase the cost of raw materials
(or make them unavailable), as well as other production costs.58 For
example, changes in weather patterns could make crops used in
clothing production unavailable, affecting the supply of products
available.59 On the demand side, newly developed “customer
preferences for carbon-friendly goods and services” could lead to
“rapid losses in the asset values of carbon-focused industries.”60
Consumers may also prioritize sustainability, altering demand for
products and even moving retailers to shift their product lines.61
Closely related, reputational risk could also affect the demand for
products from carbon-intensive industries.62 That is, in response to
stigmatization of carbon-intensive sectors, consumers may seek out
corporations that they perceive as embracing or furthering the energy
transition and avoid those seen as laggards.63
******
The physical and transition risks detailed above implicate the
financial and operational well-being of a wide range of U.S.
corporations. Thus, these risks should be clearly disclosed in corporate
financial reports. However, as the following section makes clear,
neither the SEC’s existing disclosure rules nor the array of voluntary
frameworks and standards created to supplement those regulatory
requirements currently elicit sufficient disclosures.

58

Id. at 10.
See, e.g., BSR & KERING, CLIMATE CHANGE: IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIES FOR THE
LUXURY FASHION SECTOR 3 (2015), https://perma.cc/Z2H6-5HMV (“Fashion
companies rely on agricultural production for their raw materials. This is where climate
change will have significant consequences through temperature changes, water scarcity,
and impact from catastrophic climatic events, such as cyclones and droughts. Luxury
fashion has additional vulnerabilities because raw material quality is critical to create
outstanding products and because some of these materials derive from nature-based
systems and ecological processes that can be easily disrupted by climate change.”).
60 DISCLOSURE LAB REPORT, supra note 11, at 17.
61 See, e.g., Randi Kronthal-Sacco & Tensie Whelan, Sustainable Share Index:
Research on IRI Purchasing Data (2013-2018), NYU STERN CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE
BUS. (Mar. 11, 2010), https://perma.cc/2MSF-MS5M (finding that “[p]roducts
marketed as sustainable . . . [g]rew 5.6x faster than products not marketed as
sustainable”); Karl Haller et al., Meet the 2020 Consumers Driving Change, IBM INST.
FOR BUS. VALUE (June 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/FT45-73NL.
62
TCFD REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.
63 EDF recently unveiled its Climate Authenticity Meter, which “rates how companies
and industry groups’ lobbying activities support or obstruct progress on climate policy.”
Press Release, Env’t Def. Fund, EDF Launches New Tool to Highlight Corporate
Action on Climate Policy (Oct. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/9HZC-9H7J. This tool could
be used by consumers to understand whether corporations are going beyond committing
to individual mitigation strategies to also support necessary climate-related public
policies, and make purchasing decisions on this basis.
59
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III.
EXISTING SEC REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND VOLUNTARY
FRAMEWORKS
The SEC requires every public corporation in the U.S. to file
annual and quarterly reports that disclose a variety of information
regarding the corporation’s financial health and its exposure to risk.64
As the evidence explored in Section II makes clear, climate risk has
significant implications for U.S. corporations, and foreseeable
physical and transition risks associated with climate change impacts—
and related risk management strategies and actions—should thus be
disclosed in annual and quarterly filings. Indeed, in 2010 the SEC
released guidance specifically on disclosure of climate risk (“2010
Climate Disclosure Guidance” or “2010 Guidance”).65 Yet, as
described more fully below in the last part of this Section, publicly
traded companies currently do not make comparable, specific, and
decision-useful climate risk disclosure.
While the following decade saw a spike in costly climateinduced disasters and more widespread acknowledgement of the
financial nature of climate risk, the SEC has not taken action since
2010 to improve upon the issued guidance. In the absence of SEC
activity, a variety of voluntary frameworks and standards have
emerged. Two of the most adopted examples are discussed in the
second part of this Section: The Task Force on Climate-Related
Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”) framework and the sector specific
standards for environmental, social, and corporate governance
(“ESG”) disclosures, including climate risk disclosures established by
the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”). The SEC’s
2010 Guidance was significant in acknowledging climate risk and the
emergence of voluntary frameworks and standards have been
instrumental in forward progress. However, as detailed in the third
part of this Section, the current patchwork approach to climate risk
disclosure has not led to a sufficient quantity or quality of information
for investors, regulators, and other interested stakeholders. This
Article considers sufficient disclosure to mean disclosure that is
comparable, specific, and decision-useful. These elements necessarily
overlap, but each has particular meaning and is designed to

64

See generally 17 C.F.R. Part 229 (2021); see also Ruth Jebe, The Convergence of
Financial and ESG Materiality: Taking Sustainability Mainstream, 56 AM. BUS. L.J.
645, 654–61 (2019).
65 2010 Climate Disclosure Guidance, supra note 45, at 6291.
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incorporate and reflect the core disclosure principles set out by various
governmental entities and voluntary regimes.66
Comparable, specific, and decision-useful disclosures allow
investors to make more informed decisions and allow regulators to
more effectively carry out their responsibilities. Comparable
disclosures are provided in a manner that allows users, like investors
and regulators, to understand how corporations compare with one
another in risk and performance.67 This is also useful for the
corporation itself as a benchmarking tool against competitors.68
Comparability demands consistency and standardization in what,
where, and how information is provided. Balancing comparability
with the other necessary characteristics of sufficient disclosure—
specificity and decision-usefulness—will require industry-based
standardization of disclosure rules.69 Specific disclosures provide
information that is particular to the corporation, rather than what can
be generally applicable to any corporation. Disclosure should also
balance the need for comparable industry-level information with
granular information about possible impacts on the individual

66

See, e.g., TCFD REPORT, supra note 9, at 51–54 (providing seven principles of
effective disclosure); Guidelines on Non-Financial Reporting (Methodology for
Reporting Non-Financial Information), 2017 O.J. (C 215) 5–9 [hereinafter 2017 EU
Guidance] (laying out key principles of disclosure); SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., SASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 9 (2017) [https://perma.cc/C6AHF9N4] [hereinafter “SASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK”] (noting information disclosed
under the standards should be material, decision-useful, and cost-effective).
67
TCFD REPORT, supra note 9, at 18, 53 (providing principles of disclosure including,
“disclosures should be comparable among companies within a sector, industry, or
portfolio,” meaning “disclosures should allow for meaningful comparisons of strategy,
business activities, risks, and performance across organizations and within sectors and
jurisdictions”); CFTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 91 (“Large companies are increasingly
disclosing some climate-related information, but vary significantly in the specific
information they disclose, presenting a challenge for investors and others seeking to
understand exposure to and management of climate risks.”).
68
CFTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 91 (“For all industries in which climate risk is
material, the lack of comprehensive and comparable disclosure not only poses a
challenge to investors seeking to assess, manage, and mitigate climate risk, but it also
impedes the ability of disclosing organizations to inform their strategic responses to
climate risk by benchmarking their performance against peer organizations.”).
69 SASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 66, at 5, 7 (explaining its focus on
industry-specific standards to allow useful comparison); TCFD REPORT, supra note 9,
at 18 (calling for comparable disclosure among sectors or industries); see also
SUMMARY REPORT OF THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE REVIEW OF THE NONFINANCIAL REPORTING DIRECTIVE: 20 FEBRUARY 2020 – 11 JUNE 2020, at 18–19 (2020)
[https://perma.cc/M2PB-6BDD] [hereinafter “NFRD CONSULTATION SUMMARY”]
(“80% of all respondents favour the inclusion of sector-specific elements in a reporting
standard.”).
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corporation and its assets.70 Specificity must also be balanced with
efficiency and cost concerns for preparers. Lastly, decision-useful
disclosures are of a kind and quality that allows users to “integrate
climate risk into their decision-making.”71 Relevant decisions include
not just those regarding whether and how much to invest, but also
ownership, engagement, and proxy voting-related decisions.72
A.

SEC Regulation S-K, Form 10-K, and the 2010 Climate
Disclosure Guidance

Corporate financial disclosure requirements are governed by
Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X, both promulgated under the U.S.
Securities Act of 1933.73 Broadly speaking, these regulations require
public corporations to disclose a wide range of financial and
nonfinancial information about their operations when that information
is material. S-K largely deals with qualitative, textual disclosure while
S-X focuses on financial statements.74 These mandatory disclosures
are made through standard “forms,” including Form 10-K, a detailed
annual reporting requirement that is intended to elicit a comprehensive
summary of a company’s history, structure, executive compensation,
and financial performance.75
Two aspects of the SEC’s current disclosure regime are
significant in the context of climate risk. First is the concept of
materiality—the standard that governs disclosure for most categories
of information included in an annual report. Whether climate risk is
material to a corporation is the primary question that drives whether
and to what extent climate risk is disclosed under current rules.
Second is the SEC’s 2010 Climate Disclosure Guidance, which
70 SASB describes this as a balance between corporation and industry-level information,

in discussing “company-tailored disclosures.” This is disclosure where the “company
provides disclosure using specific language that can only be understood in the context
of the issuer” and is “tailored to reflect the company’s specific and unique
circumstances” but does not “provide information allowing for quantitative
comparisons between companies.” SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., THE
STATE OF DISCLOSURE 2017: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUSTAINABILITY
DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS 7 (2017), [https://perma.cc/USC8-2HN2] [hereinafter
“SASB STATE OF DISCLOSURE”]. Disclosure using metrics that provide information
specific to the corporation but relevant to the sector allows comparison.
71 CFTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 88.
72 See, e.g., SASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 66, at 10–11.
73 ALEXANDER F. COHEN ET AL., FINANCIAL STATEMENT REQUIREMENTS IN US
SECURITIES OFFERINGS: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 1 (2020) [https://perma.cc/YG7H36CX].
74 Id.
75 How to Read a 10-K/10-Q, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (JAN. 26, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersreada10khtm.html.
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identified specific categories of climate risk that could be material and
specific Form 10-K line items to which the categories could be
relevant.
i.

The Materiality Standard

The concept of materiality plays an important role in
determining what information must be disclosed under Regulation SK and Regulation S-X.76 Materiality is also a key element of
securities fraud, which is governed by a separate regulation—Rule
10b-5. Under Rule 10b-5, if a court finds that a corporation has failed
to disclose a material fact, the corporation can be held civilly or
criminally liable.77 In a landmark 1976 decision clarifying the 10b-5
materiality standard, the Supreme Court explained that a fact is
material if there is a
substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances,
[it] would have assumed actual significance in the
deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put
another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the “total mix” of information
made available.78
The Court has subsequently characterized the test as intended to “filter
out essentially useless information that a reasonable investor would

See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(a)(1) (“In describing developments, only
information material to an understanding of the general development of the business is
required.”); id. § 229.103(a) (“Describe briefly any material pending legal proceedings,
other than ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which
the registrant or any of its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their property is the
subject.”); id. § 229.105(a) (“Where appropriate, provide under the caption “Risk
Factors” a discussion of the material factors that make an investment in the registrant or
offering speculative or risky.”); id. § 210.4-01(a) (“The information required with
respect to any statement shall be furnished as a minimum requirement to which shall be
added any further material information as is necessary to make the required statements,
in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.”)..
77 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The Supreme Court has long recognized that a private cause
of action exists for violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Basic, 485 U.S. at 230–
31.
78
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). Although the
Supreme Court in TSC was interpreting the term “materiality” as used in Rule 14a-9
(implementing Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act on proxy solicitation), the
Supreme Court concluded in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), that this
standard was appropriate in the context of Rule 10b-5 (implementing Section 10(b) of
the Act), as well.
76
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not consider significant, even as part of a larger ‘mix’ of factors to
consider in making his investment decision.”79 In the context of a
potential merger, the Court further held that for “contingent or
speculative information or events,” the materiality standard is applied
by balancing “the indicated probability that the event will occur and
the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the
company activity.”80
These Court decisions did not discuss limits on the SEC’s
authority to require disclosure of non-material information under
Regulation S-K or S-X, but the SEC incorporated the Court’s holdings
on materiality in a 1999 Staff Accounting Bulletin, which stated that
“the omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report is
material if, in the light of surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of
the item is such that it is probable that the judgment of a reasonable
person relying upon the report would have been changed or influenced
by the inclusion or correction of the item.”81
Materiality can be an elusive concept in any context because
of the discretion it affords to corporations in determining what
information is material.82 When a rule gives a company the flexibility
to withhold information if it is “not material,”83 there are no brightline rules for determining what is material, and there are no degrees of
materiality—information is either material or it is not.84 Along with a

79

Levinson, 485 U.S. at 234.
Id. at 238 (accepting test from SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849
(2d Cir. 1968)).
81
DISCLOSURE LAB REPORT, supra note 11, at 28 (citing SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin
No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999)). Accounting Bulletins “reflect the
Commission staff’s views regarding accounting-related disclosure practices. They
represent interpretations and policies followed by the Division of Corporation Finance
and the Office of the Chief Accountant in administering the disclosure requirements of
the federal securities laws.” Selected Staff Accounting Bulletins, SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMM’N
(Jan.
8,
2021),
https://www.sec.gov/regulation/staffinterpretations/accounting-bulletins [https://perma.cc/HMW6-MNBL].
82
Rick E. Hansen, Climate Change Disclosure by SEC Registrants: REvisiting the
SEC’s 2010 Interpretive Release, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 487, 502 (2012)
[https://perma.cc/U4TJ-5P37]; Virginia Harper Ho, “Comply or Explain” and the
Future of Nonfinancial Reporting, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 317, 328 (2017)
[https://perma.cc/5QS2-BPD8] (“For purposes of financial reporting, the materiality of
ESG information is a determination over which corporate management has discretion,
so ESG issues may be under-reported, particularly if firms are not adequately
identifying and monitoring ESG risk.”).
80

83

See supra note 76.

84

Hana V. Vizcarra, The Reasonable Investors and Climate-Related Information:
Changing Expectations for Financial Disclosures, 50 ENVTL. L. REP. 10106, 10112
(2020) [https://perma.cc/AJU6-QDKH].
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lack of insight into corporations’ materiality assessment processes,85
these aspects make it difficult to assess or second-guess materiality
determinations. In the climate context, deference to a corporation’s
materiality determination may be magnified by the inability to
rigorously assess those determinations, as the SEC has not historically
staffed internal climate expertise.86
While this Article primarily considers SEC authority to
require disclosure of material information to improve climate risk
disclosures, it does not foreclose the other avenues available for the
SEC to take action. The materiality standard is a self-imposed
limitation on the typical scope of the SEC’s disclosure requirements
and the Commission has occasionally required disclosures untethered
from a materiality assessment.87 Consideration of SEC pathways not
85

The materiality concept is a difficult standard to assess because the SEC often lacks
information about how these materiality determinations are made and is therefore
unable to push back on the materiality determinations made by individual corporations.
Corporations are not required to disclose their materiality assessment process, limiting
investor and regulator access to the processes underlying disclosure and providing
companies significant discretion in making disclosure decisions. Hana V. Vizcarra,
Climate Related Disclosure and Litigation Risk in the Oil & Gas Industry: Will State
Attorneys General Investigations Impede the Drive for More Expansive Disclosures?,
43 VT. L. REV. 733, 758 (2019) [https://perma.cc/93ZS-283K] (“SEC’s enforcement
role with regard to disclosures is limited by the information it can review. The division
of the agency that reviews disclosures for compliance with SEC rules does not have
subpoena power, does not have access to the underlying information that companies
consider in making their materiality determinations, and has little training in climaterelated disclosure.” (emphasis added)).
86 Id.
87 Academic authors have argued that the SEC is not bound exclusively to the
materiality standard. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Disclosure’s Purpose, 107 GEO. L.J.
1045 (2019) [https://perma.cc/978E-A8U8] (arguing the SEC has authority to require
disclosure in the public interest). The CFTC report also recommended that financial
regulators like the SEC “consider additional, appropriate avenues for firms to disclose
other substantive climate risks that do not pass the materiality threshold over various
time horizons.” CFTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 132. However, as argued below, without
going beyond the bounds of materiality, the SEC should acknowledge that the changing
structure of capital markets means that what the “reasonable investor” considers
material includes information related to systematic, non-diversifiable, risks, including
climate-related risks. John C. Coffee, The Future of Disclosures: ESG, Common
Ownership, and Systematic Risk (European Corp. Governance Inst. Law, Working
Paper No. 541/2020, 2021) [https://perma.cc/R7GS-KZCH] (arguing that SEC has
authority to require disclosure of systemic risks); see also INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY,
CORPORATE CLIMATE RISK: ASSESSMENT, DISCLOSURE, AND ACTION CONFERENCE
BRIEF 12–13 (2021) [https://perma.cc/N5BB-CLBT] [hereinafter “POL’Y INTEGRITY
CONFERENCE BRIEF”] (summarizing remarks by Robert Jackson, former SEC
commissioner); Inst. for Pol’y Integrity, Keynote Remarks by Rob Jackson (with
Richard
Revesz),
at
19:34,
YOUTUBE
(Oct.
6,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yXVaz-x7Ans (arguing that the SEC’s authority
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premised upon materiality are, however, beyond the scope of this
Article.
ii.

The 2010 Climate Disclosure Guidance

In 2010, the SEC made clear that climate risk may be material
to corporations in some circumstances and thus subject to disclosure
under Regulation S-K.88 The 2010 Climate Disclosure Guidance
identified four specific portions of Form 10-K where climate risk
could be relevant. While the SEC finalized amendments to these
sections in 2020,89 the 2010 Guidance remains the most relevant
statement from the SEC on climate risk disclosure and the general
principles it established remain in place. In relevant part, the 2010
Guidance included the following requirements:

under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is sufficiently expansive to encompass
disclosures related to systemic rather than corporation-specific risk and noting that the
Commission, in fact, required disclosures of some systemic risks in a 2010 rulemaking).
88
2010 Climate Disclosure Guidance, supra note 45, at 6290.
89 Critics of the 2020 amendments to Regulation S-K observed that it did not “make any
attempt to address investors’ need for standardized disclosure on climate change risk.”
See Modernization of Regulations S–K Items 101, 103, and 105, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,726,
63,742 (Oct. 8, 2020); Public Statement, Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, Securities &
Exchange Comm’n, “Modernizing” Regulation S-K: Ignoring the Elephant in the Room
(Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-mda-2020-01-30
[https://perma.cc/PCY5-DVP6]. The SEC finalized amendments to various portions of
Regulation S-K that effectively shifted disclosure to more heavily rely upon a
“principles-based” approach, which can be contrasted with line-item disclosure. Lineitem disclosure is a fairly prescriptive approach that utilizes “bright-line, quantitative
or other thresholds to identify when disclosure is required or require registrants to
disclose the same types of information.” Principles-based disclosure, by contrast,
provides greater flexibility to corporations to determine “(1) whether certain
information is material, and (2) how to disclose such information.” Principles-based
disclosure “articulates a disclosure ‘concept’ rather than a hard rule.” See, e.g., Jay
Knight, Recent SEC Comment Letter Reveals the Difference Between PrescriptiveBased and Principles-Based Rules, BASS BERRY SIMMS (Nov. 5, 2020),
https://www.bassberrysecuritieslawexchange.com/prescriptive-based-principlesbased-rules-securites-exchange-commission-sec-comment-letter/
[https://perma.cc/4ETY-A8LE].
The 2020 amendments were criticized by Commissioners Lee and Jackson, who shared
two primary concerns: principles-based disclosure (1) “gives company executives
discretion over what they tell investors” and (2) “can produce inconsistent information
that investors cannot easily compare.” Public Statement, Robert J. Jackson & Allison
Herren Lee, Comm’rs, Securities & Exchange Comm’n, Joint Statement of
Commissioners Robert J. Jackson, Jr. and Allison Herren Lee on Proposed Changes to
Regulation
S-K
(Aug.
27,
2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/statement-jackson-lee-082719 [https://perma.cc/5RK7-RV24]. To ensure
that future regulations yield comparable, specific, and decision-useful disclosures of
climate risk, the SEC should thus carefully consider how to balance line-item and
principles-based disclosure requirements.
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Item 101: Description of Business. Item 101
requires a corporation to describe its general
development, as well as its “form of organization,
principal products and services, major customers,
and competitive conditions.”90 Potentially relevant
provisions include “the material effects that
compliance with Federal, State and local
provisions . . . may have upon the capital
expenditures, earnings and competitive position of
the registrant and its subsidiaries.”91

•

Item 103: Legal Proceedings. Item 103 requires
corporations to “describe briefly any material
pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary
routine litigation . . . to which the registrant or any
of its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their
property is the subject.”92

•

Item 303: Management’s Discussion and Analysis
of Financial Condition and Results of Operations
(MD&A). Item 303 provides an opportunity for the
corporation to “communicate to shareholders
management’s view of the company’s financial
condition and prospects.”93 This item requires
disclosure of “material events and uncertainties

767

90

2010 Climate Disclosure Guidance, supra note 45, at 6293; 17 C.F.R. Part 229 § 101.
17 C.F.R. Part 229 § 101(c)(1)(xii) (2008). Additionally, while not noted in the
guidance, this item also required disclosure of the “[s]ources and availability of raw
materials[.]” Id. § 101(c)(1)(iii) (2008). This requirement was retained in the 2020
amendments but explicitly limited to encompass only those resources “material to a
registrant’s business.” Id. § 229.101(c)(1)(iii)(A) (2020).
92 Id. § 229.103(a). Later regulatory amendments have added that disclosure of
environmental legal proceedings is required (and not subject to the “ordinary litigation”
exception) if it “involves potential monetary sanctions of $300,000 or more, or at the
election of the registrant, such other amount that that the registrant determines is
reasonably designed to result in disclosure of any such proceeding that is material to its
business or financial condition.” Modernization of Regulations S-K Items 101, 103, and
105, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,726, 63,742 (Oct. 8, 2020); DISCLOSURE LAB REPORT, supra note
11, at 30.
93 2010 Climate Disclosure Guidance, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6294. This item is intended to
accomplish three principal objectives: (1) “enabl[ing] investors to see the company
through the eyes of management,” (2) “provid[ing] the context within which financial
information should be analyzed,” and (3) providing information about earnings and
cash flow that allows investors to “ascertain the likelihood that past performance is
indicative of future performance.” Id. (emphasis added).
91
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known to management that would cause reported
financial information not to be necessarily
indicative of future operating results or of future
financial condition.”94 A “trend, demand,
commitment, event or uncertainty” must be
disclosed if the corporation cannot affirmatively
determine that it is not reasonably likely to occur
and not reasonably likely to have a material
effect.95
•

Item 503(c): Risk Factors.96 Item 503(c) requires
registrants to provide “a discussion of the most
significant factors that make the offering
speculative or risky.”97 Registrants are encouraged
to focus on risks that are unique or specific to their
businesses, rather than general risks that are
associated with the market as a whole.98

The 2010 Guidance also identified four categories of climate
risk for reporting corporations to consider: (1) compliance and
litigation issues with legislation and regulation; (2) compliance and
litigation issues with international accords; (3) the indirect

94

DISCLOSURE LAB REPORT, supra note 11, at 31. Notably, this item is intended to be
forward looking and the Commission has not provided any specific time horizon that
should be assessed, but has instead left that decision to the company under the
circumstances. 2010 Climate Disclosure Guidance, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6294.
95 2010 Climate Disclosure Guidance, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6295. The SEC uses a two prong
test, in which management must make two determinations. The first determination is
the likelihood of occurrence, the second is the likelihood of material effect if it occurs.
Management must determine how likely it is to occur: “[i]f management determines
that it is not reasonably likely to occur, no disclosure is required. [But] if management
cannot make that determination, it must evaluate objectively the consequences of the
known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty, on the assumption that it will
come to fruition. Disclosure is then required unless management determines that a
material effect on the registrant's financial condition or results of operations is not
reasonably likely to occur.” Id.
96 This item has been moved to new item 105 with some changes. See Modernization
of Regulations S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,726, 63,742–46 (Oct. 8,
2020). Because this Section of the report is intended to discuss the 2010 Guidance, it
continues to use item 503 throughout when discussing the Risk Factors disclosure
requirement. However, there are important changes to note. First, item 105 replaces
“most significant” with “material” in identifying which factors must be discussed. Id.
Second, item 105 eliminates the requirement to disclose “unique or specific”
information, in favor of more general risk. Id.
97 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2008).
98 2010 Climate Disclosure Guidance, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6294.
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consequences of regulation or business trends, such as decreased
demand for products or the public perception associated with
emissions; and (4) physical impacts, like property damage or the
disruptions in supply chains and operations of customers.99 For each
of these categories, the SEC provided specific examples and explained
how they might trigger disclosure under the four line items.100
B. Voluntary Frameworks and Standards: TCFD and SASB
A variety of voluntary disclosure standards and frameworks
have been developed as supplements to the SEC regulations and
guidance described above. This Section discusses two of the most
adopted voluntary efforts: the TCFD framework and the SASB
standards. Although developed by separate entities, the two tools are
best understood as complementary. The TCFD framework is just that:
a framework. It sets forth core elements and broad disclosure
recommendations. It explicitly does not, however, “develop any
detailed, industry-specific standards or metrics for disclosing [climaterelated] risks.”101 Granular voluntary standards, including but not
limited to the SASB standards, are being used to fill in this detail.102
99

Id. at 6295–97. The first two align well with the legal and policy transition risks, the
third with the technological, market, and reputational transition risks, and the fourth
with physical risk, each discussed in Section II.
100 For example, potential domestic and international law may trigger disclosure under
all items. Potential climate change legislation and regulation may need to be disclosed
under both Items 303 and 503(c). Id. at 6295–96. As to the indirect consequences of
regulation or business trends, 503(c) may require disclosure of reputational risks—
where public perception of a corporation’s contribution to climate change could expose
it to adverse consequences on operations or financial conditions, that should be
disclosed. Id. Both Item 101 and the MD&A may require disclosure of climate-related
changes in demand for goods and services or increases in competition. Id. The 2010
Guidance is also clear that physical effects of climate change can affect a corporation’s
operations and results, which could potentially trigger disclosure as a risk under 503(c)
or the MD&A. Id. at 6296–97. Because “severe weather can have a devastating effect
on the financial condition of affected businesses,” vulnerable companies should
disclose relevant climate risk. Id. at 6297.
101 DISCLOSURE LAB REPORT, supra note 11, at 40. The TCFD has provided a few
sectors with some guidance, however. See TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN.
DISCLOSURES, IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON
CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 52–55 (2017) [https://perma.cc/KA7E6WYL].
102 Some of the other prominent standard setters include CDP, the Climate Disclosure
Standards Board (“CDSB”), the Global Reporting Initiative, and the International
Integrated Reporting Council. We do not take a position on the relative value of each
of these, which have different standards and purposes. For more information on each of
these standards and how they align, see CDP ET AL., STATEMENT OF INTENT TO WORK
TOGETHER TOWARDS COMPREHENSIVE CORPORATE REPORTING 7 (2020)
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And while the SASB standards were not developed for the express
purpose of supplementing the TCFD framework, SASB has published
guidance explaining how they can be used in conjunction.103
i.

The TCFD Framework

The TCFD was established in 2015 by the Financial Stability
Board, an international organization with members from twenty-four
of the world’s major economies, and representatives from oversight
organizations such as the European Central Bank and the International
Monetary Fund.104 The TCFD’s stated purpose is “to develop
recommendations for more effective climate-related disclosures that
could promote more informed investment, credit, and insurance
underwriting decisions” and that “would enable stakeholders to
understand better the concentrations of carbon-related assets in the
financial sector and the financial system’s exposures to climate-related
risks.”105
In 2017, the TCFD published its final report establishing a
voluntary framework for disclosure of potential financial impacts of
climate risk.106 It provides detailed examples of climate risk and the
financial impacts that may result.107 It also clarifies that disclosure
should be made in annual financial filings, not in supplemental
sustainability reports.108 A key feature of the report’s
[https://perma.cc/L9Y2-8U3S] [hereinafter “STANDARD SETTER STATEMENT OF
INTENT”].
103 Press Release, Sustainability Accounting Standards Bd., SASB and CDSB Release
Handbook, Highlighting Real-World Reporting on Climate-Related Financial Risks
and Opportunities (Sept. 23, 2019) [https://perma.cc/P77L-XFH6] (explaining the
handbook is intended “carry the TCFD’s work forward” and to align their own tools
with the TCFD’s recommendations). SASB and the CDSB describe the relationship of
the TCFD framework, CDSB framework and SASB standards as follows:
The TCFD recommendations serve as a global foundation for effective climate related
disclosures. The CDSB Framework helps organizations integrate and disclose
financially material climate and natural capital-related information into their annual
reports. The SASB standards help organizations to collect, structure, and effectively
disclose related performance data for the material, climate-related risks and
opportunities they have identified.
CLIMATE DISCLOSURE STANDARDS BD. & SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
BD., TCFD IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 4 (2019) [https://perma.cc/9JT3-URSV].
104 Members of the FSB, FIN. STABILITY BD. (Dec. 9, 2020) [https://perma.cc/YH9UQQ7A].
105 TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, TASK FORCE ON CLIMATERELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES: OVERVIEW 7 (2020) [https://perma.cc/Q4V6DK56].
106 TCFD REPORT, supra note 9.
107 E.g., id. at 10–11.
108 Id. at 17.
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recommendations is their generality: the disclosure recommendations
are intended to be “widely adoptable” and “applicable to organizations
across all sectors and jurisdictions.”109 The framework is structured
around four core elements: (1) “the organization’s governance around
climate-related risks and opportunities” (governance); (2) “the actual
and potential impacts of climate-related risks and opportunities on the
organization’s businesses, strategy, and financial planning” (strategy);
(3) “the processes used by the organization to identify, assess, and
manage climate-related risks” (risk management); and (4) “the metrics
and targets used to assess and manage relevant climate-related risks
and opportunities” (metrics and targets).110
Within these core elements, the TCFD recommends eleven
specific disclosures. Under governance, the TCFD asks all
corporations to “[d]escribe the board’s oversight of climate-related
risks and opportunities,” and “management’s role in assessing and
managing” these risks and opportunities.111 For strategy, corporations
should “[d]escribe the climate-related risks and opportunities the
organization has identified over the short, medium, and long term,”
their impact “on the organization’s businesses, strategy, and financial
planning,” and “the resilience of the organization’s strategy, taking
into consideration different climate-related scenarios, including a 2°C
or lower scenario.”112 As to risk management, disclosure includes
describing “the organization’s processes for identifying and assessing
climate-related risks” and “for managing climate-related risks,” and
how those processes “are integrated into the organization’s overall risk
management.”113 Finally, under metrics and targets, corporations
should disclose “the metrics used by the organization to assess
climate-related risks and opportunities in line with its strategy and risk
management process,” and the “Scope 1, Scope 2, and, if appropriate,
Scope 3 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and the related risks.” 114
Corporations should also describe “the targets used by the

109

Id. at iii.
Id. at 14.
111 Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114 Id. Scope 1 emissions are direct emissions from sources owned or controlled by the
corporation (e.g., emissions from on-site fossil fuel combustion). Scope 2 emissions are
indirect emissions from sources controlled by the corporation (e.g., emissions resulting
from the purchase of electricity). Scope 3 emissions are from sources not owned or
directly controlled by the corporation, but related to the corporation’s activities (e.g.,
emissions resulting from employee commuting). Cf. EPA, Greenhouse Gases at EPA
[https://perma.cc/B4B4-JJ3W].
110
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organization to manage climate-related risks and opportunities and
performance against targets.”115
As a final layer, the TCFD framework provides guidance on
how to go about making these recommended disclosures—that is,
what kinds of information to provide in a disclosure. For example,
under the first recommended disclosure for governance, “board
oversight,” one suggested item includes the “processes and frequency
by which the board and/or board committees . . . are informed about
climate-related issues.”116 The TCFD report identifies seven principles
that should guide corporate disclosures. Climate-related disclosures
should be (1) relevant; (2) specific and complete; (3) clear, balanced,
and understandable; (4) consistent over time; (5) comparable among
companies within a sector, industry or portfolio; (6) reliable,
verifiable, and objective; and (7) timely.117
The TCFD framework has garnered broad support from the
investment community, regulators, and corporations.118 The TCFD’s
2020 Status Report found that 1,340 corporations globally have
expressed support for its recommendations, including 219 U.S.
companies.119 Financial institutions managing $150 trillion have stated
support for the TCFD,120 including major investors like BlackRock,
which alone manages over $7 trillion in assets.121 Countries have
increasingly announced their support for the framework, with some
announcing intent to mandate disclosures that align with its
recommendations, most recently New Zealand and the United
Kingdom (“UK”).122 And in the European Union (“EU”), a recent

115

Id.
Id. at 19.
117 Id. at 18.
118 EDF and Policy Integrity, along with the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at
Columbia Law School, submitted joint comments to the New York Public Service
Commission, which responds to the Commission’s query as to whether it should adopt
the TCFD framework, including discussion of support for the TCFD and various other
regimes. See Env’t Def. Fund, Inst. for Pol’y Integrity & The Sabin Ctr. for Climate
Change L. at Colum. L. Sch., Joint Comments to the N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Case
No. 20-M-0499 – In the Matter Regarding the Need for Reporting Risks Related to
Climate Change (Dec. 9, 2020) [hereinafter “Joint Comments to NYPSC”].
119 TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, 2020 STATUS REPORT 2, 68
(2020) [https://perma.cc/55QE-4RFL] [hereinafter “TCFD 2020 STATUS REPORT”].
120
Id. at 2.
121 Larry Fink, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, BLACKROCK (Jan. 14, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/RCG7-EC73].
122 Mark Segal, UK Becomes First Country in the World to Make TCFD-Aligned
Disclosures Mandatory, ESG TODAY (Nov. 9, 2020) [https://perma.cc/2DU9-HT78];
Mandatory Climate-Related Financial Disclosure Proposed, RADIO NEW ZEALAND
116

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931076

CONDON – MANDATING DISCLOSURE OF CLIMATE RISK (DO NOT DELETE)

4/17/2022 1:41 AM

2022] MANDATING DISCLOSURE OF CLIMATE RISK

773

public consultation survey on amending the Non-Financial Reporting
Directive (“NFRD”) found that seventy-one percent of respondents
agreed that any changes should incorporate the TCFD framework.123
ii.

The SASB Standards

As noted above, granular voluntary standards that encourage
corporations to provide details compatible with the TCFD framework
have also emerged.124 While many of these organizations share
similarities in their missions and principles, SASB’s work serves as a
leading example of a set of standards that supplements the TCFD
framework by providing detail and specificity. Over 450 companies
have adopted SASB’s industry-specific standards, including 234 in the
S&P Global 1200.125 Major investors, including BlackRock and State
Street Global Advisors, also rely on the standards.126
The SASB standards provide accounting standards for
climate-related disclosure. SASB itself is modeled upon the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), a private organization that
serves as the SEC’s designated accounting standard setter.127 SASB
(Sept. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/W8Y8-G4WL]; TCFD 2020 STATUS REPORT, supra
note 119, at 3; CFTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 96 (also noting Canadian officials have
recommended the adoption of the TCFD).
123 NFRD CONSULTATION SUMMARY, supra note 69, at 21 (588 responses were
submitted by stakeholders across Europe and elsewhere, representing users and
prepares, financial and non-financial corporations, academia and non-governmental
organizations).
Although the TCFD framework has been rightfully heralded, critics have pointed to
several weaknesses of the framework. Aside from the fact that the framework has not
elicited sufficient disclosure, as discussed below, other criticism include that it provides
too much flexibility to corporations over which scenarios to choose when conducting
scenario analysis and insufficiently focuses on short-term risk disclosure. See POLICY
INTEGRITY CONFERENCE BRIEF, supra note 87, at 8–9 (summarizing remarks of
Margaret Peloso of Vinson & Elkins LLP).
124
Helle Bank Jorgensen, Demystifying the “Alphabet Soup” of Reporting
Frameworks,
REUTERS
EVENTS
(June
27,
2018),
https://www.reutersevents.com/sustainability/demystifying-alphabet-soup-reportingframeworks [https://perma.cc/TE4K-FDYT].
125 Global Use of SASB Standards, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD.,
https://www.sasb.org/about/global-use [https://perma.cc/SH4W-F64G].
126 Fink, supra note 121; Letter from Cyrus Taraporevala, Pres. & Chief Exec. Officer,
State Street Global Advisors, to Board Members (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://www.ssga.com/library-content/pdfs/insights/CEOs-letter-on-SSGA-2020proxy-voting-agenda.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K7W-SWFZ].
127 See Jebe, supra note 64, at 667–68. An accounting standard is a “standardized
guiding principle that determines the policies and practices of financial accounting” and
is intended to improve transparency and facilitate reporting. What Is an Accounting
Standard?,
CORP.
FIN.
INST.,
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aims to create FASB-like standards focused on sustainability for use
in SEC filings like the 10-K annual report.128 SASB standards hew
closely to U.S. securities law by focusing on factors that are most
likely to be deemed material under existing case law and SEC
regulations.129 SASB characterizes sustainability accounting as a
complement to financial reporting that “provide[s] a more complete
view of a corporation’s performance on material factors likely to
affect its ability to create long-term value.”130 SASB’s approach,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/accounting/accountingstandard/ [https://perma.cc/SHG3-2JAU]. FASB only sets standards; it does not enforce
compliance with them or the content of disclosures.
Some have argued that FASB could be the appropriate authority for setting nonfinancial
standards to complement its financial accounting standards. The organization has the
infrastructure, institutional knowledge, and credibility with the investment and
corporate community to successfully create nonfinancial information accounting
standards. While FASB has no plans to set sustainability standards, the governing
organization for its international counterpart recently took steps toward doing so. The
International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation, home to the International
Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”), the organization that sets the financial reporting
standards for most of the world, recently published a consultation paper setting out
potential options for involvement in sustainability reporting. One of its options is to
create a counterpart to the IASB in the form of a Sustainability Standards Board to
develop global sustainability standards. RICHARD BARKER & ROBERT G. ECCLES,
SHOULD FASB AND IASB BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SETTING STANDARDS FOR
NONFINANCIAL
INFORMATION?
(2018),
https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2018-10/Green%20Paper_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/63WC-48G5]; INT’L FIN. REPORTING STANDARDS FOUND.,
CONSULTATION
PAPER
ON
SUSTAINABILITY
REPORTING
(2020),
https://cdn.ifrs.org/content/dam/ifrs/project/sustainability-reporting/consultationpaper-on-sustainability-reporting.pdf [https://perma.cc/XR2S-VTKL].
128
BARKER & ECCLES, supra note 127, at 21.
129 Id. SASB’s focus on the impact of climate risk for investors can be contrasted with
the GRI’s focus on the broader society. The GRI’s disclosure standards are more
tailored to address how the corporation will affect the environment; SASB, vice versa.
See Dunstan Allison-Hope, Can the GRI and SASB Reporting Frameworks Be
Collaborative? GREENBIZ (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/can-griand-sasb-reporting-frameworks-be-collaborative
[https://perma.cc/PW7S-CPHC].
Notably, the TSC materiality standard is different than that in other countries, including
those in the European Union, which has a double materiality standard for nonfinancial
information—disclosure is required for information on how climate change impacts the
company and how the company impacts climate change. 2017 EU Guidance, supra note
66, at 5; Guidelines on Non-Financial Reporting: Supplement to Reporting ClimateRelated Information, 2019 O.J. (C 209), at 4–5 (June 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7CC5UKV8]. The TCFD report acknowledges that some recommended disclosures may not
be “clearly tied to an assessment of materiality” but that “[b]ecause climate-related risk
is a non-diversifiable risk that affects nearly all sectors, many investors believe it
requires special attention.” TCFD REPORT, supra note 9, at 34.
130 SASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 66, at 4–5. “Sustainability accounting
refers to the measurement, management, and reporting” of “corporate activities that
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therefore, “consists of defining operational metrics on material,
industry-specific sustainability topics likely to affect current or future
financial value.”131 A core objective is to provide decision-useful
information for both the corporation and its investors.132
The SASB standards are industry-specific, with quantitative
metrics for seventy-seven different sectors.133 SASB selects
sustainability topics it deems material to the industry and provides
accounting metrics—that is, the information that actually must be
reported—for each topic.134 Topics selected must (1) have the
potential to affect corporate value; (2) be of interest to investors; (3)
be relevant across an industry; (4) be actionable by (within the control
of) companies; and (5) be reflective of stakeholder consensus.135 The
metrics chosen must meet explicit criteria, namely: fair representation,
useful, applicable, comparable, complete, verifiable, aligned, neutral,
and distributive.136
SASB’s standards are also detailed. For example, its standards
for the semiconductor industry include metrics such as “processor
energy efficiency,” which is required to be disclosed in watts for
servers, desktops, and laptops, and “total emissions from
perfluorinated compounds.”137 Notably, not all of SASB’s standards
focus on climate-related information; it provides standards on five
dimensions of sustainability: environment, social capital, human
capital, business model and innovation, and leadership and
governance.138 SASB’s standards require many, if not all, industries to
maintain or enhance the ability of the company to create value over the long term.” Id.
at 2, 4.
131 Id. at 5.
132 Id. at 9.
133
Standards
Overview,
SUSTAINABILITY
ACCT.
STANDARDS
BD.,
https://www.sasb.org/standards/ [https://perma.cc/4UD5-U8UX].
134 See SASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 66, at 10.
135 Id. at 18–19.
136 Id. at 19. SASB has recently proposed to amend its criteria by adding the
characteristic “understandable” to this list, removing “useful” (as redundant because the
core objective of the standards is to elicit useful information), and consolidating
“applicable” and “distributive” under “aligned” and “comparable,” respectively.
SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE SASB
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK & RULES OF PROCEDURE: BASES FOR CONCLUSIONS &
INVITATION TO COMMENT ON EXPOSURE DRAFTS 8–9 (2020), https://www.sasb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/Invitation-to-Comment-SASB-CF-RoP.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3THG-AA55].
137 SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., SEMICONDUCTORS: SUSTAINABILITY
ACCOUNTING
STANDARD
6
(2018),
https://www.sasb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/Semiconductors_Standard_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/7J7SDXJE] [hereinafter SASB SEMICONDUCTORS STANDARD].
138 SASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 66, at 2–3.
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report on emissions and energy consumption, both of which are highly
relevant to transition risks. Some metrics are also relevant to physical
risk, such as the water management metrics, which include
information on withdrawal and consumption generally and in areas
designated high stress,139 and the grid resilience metrics for electric
utilities, which demand information on the number and causes of
disruptions and on efforts to address future disruptions.140
C. The Existing Regime Is Not Producing Sufficient Disclosure
While the SEC’s 2010 Guidance and the rise of voluntary
frameworks and standards have been important steps toward improved
disclosure, neither has yielded comparable, specific, and decisionuseful information on climate risk for investors. The SEC’s 2010
Guidance represented a significant step: for the first time, a U.S.
federal agency recognized that climate change creates financial risks
that should be disclosed by corporations. In practice, however, the
SEC’s 2010 Guidance did not result in the disclosure many expected.
In a report to Congress two years after its publication, the SEC
concluded that it had not seen a noticeable change in disclosure from
the year before the guidance came out to the year after.141 Outside
studies conducted in the first few years after publication of the
guidance reached similar conclusions.142 One examination of
disclosures made for fiscal years 2010 to 2013, for example, found
that disclosures “are very brief, provide little discussion of material
issues, and do not quantify impacts or risk,” and that forty-one percent
of corporations did not include any climate-related disclosure in their
annual report.143 Even now, some corporations continue to avoid
climate risk disclosures altogether.144 Others provide only boilerplate

139

See, e.g., SASB SEMICONDUCTORS STANDARD, supra note 137, at 11–14.
SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ELECTRIC UTILITIES & POWER
GENERATORS: SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARD 43–45 (2018).
141 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-188, CLIMATE RELATED RISKS: SEC
HAS TAKEN STEPS TO CLARIFY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 15 (2018),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-188.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TSW-T22B].
142 JIM COBURN & JACKIE COOK, CERES, COOL RESPONSE: THE SEC & CORPORATE
CLIMATE CHANGE REPORTING, SEC CLIMATE GUIDANCE & S&P 500 REPORTING—2010
TO
2013
5
(2014),
https://www.ceres.org/sites/default/files/reports/201703/Ceres_SECguidance-append_020414_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JE8-2DJP].
143 Id.
144 See generally PARKER BOLSTAD, SADIE FRANK, ERIC GESICK, & D AVID V ICTOR,
BROOKINGS INST., FLYING BLIND: WHAT DO INVESTORS REALLY KNOW ABOUT CLIMATE
CHANGE RISKS IN THE U.S. EQUITY AND MUNICIPAL DEBT MARKETS? 3–4 (2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/WP67_Victor-et-al.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8LNV-BEGK].
140
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disclosures that are neither corporation-specific (or even industryspecific) nor decision-useful—that is, they do not help investors
understand and assess the risk the corporation faces or how that risk
compares to those faced by other corporations.145
The outgrowth of voluntary frameworks and standards,
although a critical development, has not resolved these core
challenges. SASB conducted a State of Disclosure report in 2017 and
found that “the most common form of disclosure across the majority
of industries and topics was generic boilerplate language, which is
inadequate for investment decision-making.”146 Boilerplate disclosure
is not tailored to “reflect the company’s specific and unique
circumstances,” and thus fails to provide its audience with “sufficient
and significant information to differentiate between the company and
most, if not all, of its peers.”147 For example, the insurance company
Prudential acknowledged the reality of climate risk in its Form 10-K,
but merely stated that “climate change may increase the frequency and
severity of weather related disasters and pandemics,” and that their
operations may be threatened by the “occurrence of natural disasters,
including hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, [and]
tornadoes.”148 The SASB report found that overall, “companies
continue to take a minimally compliant approach to sustainability
disclosure, providing the market with information that is inadequate
for efficient pricing and effective decision making.”149
More recent reports have reached similar conclusions. One
2020 study, for example, found that while disclosure may have
increased in quantity, “[m]ore firms are disclosing more general
information that is essentially of no utility to the marketplace.”150
Although the data show that more corporations are saying more,151
much of the disclosure involves only transition risk, most of it does
not quantify risk, and much of the information disclosed is
unsurprising.152 Exxon Mobil’s 2019 annual report is a touchstone
example, explaining that “a number of countries have adopted, or are

145

Id.
SASB STATE OF DISCLOSURE, supra note 7069, at 2.
147 Id. at 7. More generally, boilerplate disclosure involves “standardized, recyclable
language,” and results in corporations providing “essentially identical disclosures.”
Jeremy McClane, Boilerplate and the Impact of Disclosure in Securities Dealmaking,
72 VAND. L. REV. 192, 194–95 (2019).
148 SASB STATE OF DISCLOSURE, supra note 70, at 39.
149 Id. at 3.
150 BOLSTAD ET AL., supra note 144, at 3.
151 Id. at 6-7; TCFD 2020 STATUS REPORT, supra note 119, at 12.
152 BOLSTAD ET AL., supra note 144, at 10–11.
146
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considering the adoption of, regulatory frameworks to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions” and that such policies could “make our
products more expensive, less competitive, lengthen project
implementation times, and reduce demand for hydrocarbons, as well
as shift hydrocarbon demand toward relatively lower carbon sources
such as natural gas.”153 The report further notes that “current and
pending greenhouse gas regulations or policies may also increase our
compliance costs, such as for monitoring or sequestering
emissions.”154 These general statements could apply to any energy
company and are thus useless for investors seeking to make crosscompany comparisons of climate risk. The disclosure contains, for
example, no analysis of which of Exxon’s planned capital
expenditures are for projects that would be unprofitable in a future that
meets the goals of the Paris Agreement (<2°C warming), or under
other policy scenarios.155
Disclosure can be lacking even where corporations have
committed to, and are ostensibly seeking to align reporting with, the
TCFD framework and/or SASB standards. In its 2020 Status Report,
the TCFD found that only seventeen percent of companies discussed
their process for integrating climate change into risk management, and
only seven percent discussed resilience of strategy, two key
recommended disclosures.156 The recommendation most reported was
disclosure of risks and opportunities identified, yet only forty-one
percent of companies made that disclosure.157 And, while hundreds of
corporations have signed on to the TCFD framework, less than eight
percent comply with the recommendation to provide climate risk
information in their annual report.158
IV.
CURRENT IMPEDIMENTS TO IMPROVED DISCLOSURE
Dissatisfied with the nonexistent or perfunctory disclosures
described above, investors have become increasingly aggressive in
153

Exxon Mobil Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 3 (Feb. 26, 2020).
Id.
155 Cf. CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, EXXONMOBIL COMPANY ENGAGEMENT PROFILE 5
(2019),
https://carbontracker.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/CTI_CA100_OG_2019_Exxon.pdf (calculating that at least
55% of Exxon’s planned capital expenditures are inconsistent with a policy pathway
that limits warming to 1.7-1.8°C).
156 TCFD 2020 STATUS REPORT, supra note 119, at 11.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 11–12. SASB also found that less than 8% of reporting companies provided
the information in an annual report. Global Use of SASB Standards, SUSTAINABILITY
ACCT.
STANDARDS
BD.,
https://www.sasb.org/about/global-use
[https://perma.cc/SH4W-F64G].
154
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demanding more information on climate risk from corporations in
which they hold shares. At the time of this writing, 545 investors,
collectively managing more than $52 trillion in assets, have signed the
Climate Action 100+ Statement, committing to advocate for improved
climate risk disclosures in line with the TCFD recommendations by
investee companies.159 Signatories include two of the largest fund
managers in the world, BlackRock and State Street Global Advisors.
Major investors are also using the climate risk information they do
have to make prudent investment decisions.160
One might think that these investor calls alone would be
sufficient to prompt improved disclosure, but for a number of reasons,
managers might be unresponsive to shareholder demands in the
absence of a legal mandate to satisfy them. These include marketrelated explanations surrounding information and incentive
mismatches among corporations and managers, and the SEC’s past
disinterest in and non-enforcement of climate risk disclosure.

159

Investors, CLIMATE ACTION 100+, https://www.climateaction100.org/investors/
[https://perma.cc/3ZXK-AQVJ].
Additionally, a growing number of shareholder proposals are calling for increased
climate consideration, assessment, disclosure, and management. During the 2020 proxy
season, at least 140 climate-related shareholder proposals were filed at U.S. companies.
Rob Berridge, How Climate Proposals Fared During the 2020 Proxy Season, CERES
(Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.ceres.org/news-center/blog/how-climate-proposalsfared-during-2020-proxy-season [https://perma.cc/MT3N-M7E3]. While many of these
proposals failed to garner a majority vote, the proposals averaged over 30% approval,
an increase over previous years, and 40% were withdrawn in return for commitments
by the corporation. Id. Notable winning proposals included a Phillips 66 shareholder
proposals on petrochemical climate risk and a Chevron shareholder proposal
demanding greater disclosure on whether the corporation’s lobbying activities align
with goals to limit global warming. Press Release, As You Sow, Majority Vote –
Phillips 66 Shareholders Strongly Back Petrochemical Climate-Risk Resolution (May
8, 2020), https://www.asyousow.org/press-releases/2020/5/8/phillips-66-shareholderproposal-climate-change [https://perma.cc/W4JD-ZJB7]; CHEVRON, 2020 PROXY
STATEMENT 78 (May 31, 2020), https://www.chevron.com/-/media/sharedmedia/documents/chevron-proxy-statement-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z288-YEJL].
160
In January 2020, BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, announced its intent
to exit investments from companies that generate more than 25% of their revenues from
thermal coal production. Fink, supra note 121. In September, Morgan Stanley
announced that it plans to move all of its loans and investments out of fossil fuels in the
next thirty years. Press Release, Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley Announces
Commitment to Reach Net Zero Financed Emissions by 2050 (Sept. 21, 2020),
https://www.morganstanley.com/press-releases/morgan-stanley-announcescommitment-to-reach-net-zero-financed-e [https://perma.cc/ZMP3-9B9E]. Investors
are finding new ways to integrate climate information, including acquiring climate data
and risk analysis companies. See Vizcarra, supra note 84, at 10109–10.
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Markets’ Failure to Drive Disclosure

In an “ideal” market—where a corporation and its managers’
incentives are fully aligned, and managers make informed, rational
decisions with the goal of maximizing the corporation’s long-term
value—corporations would already be addressing climate risk and
disclosing this information to their investors. However, in reality,
persistent information failures, conflicting managerial incentives, and
biased decision-making heuristics have led to the widespread problem
of insufficient climate risk disclosure.
Information asymmetry between climate scientists and
corporate managers represents a primary hurdle to effective disclosure
of climate risk.161 While managers may have the asset-level data that
is necessary for a proper valuation of climate risk, they usually do not
have the most up-to-date information on how climate change is
expected to affect different geographic regions. Climate experts
advising investors have the opposite problem, as they lack the firmspecific information that is necessary to assess climate risk on a firmby-firm basis.
This information asymmetry persists when managers decline
to disclose asset-level information to investors, which can occur when
managements’ incentives are not aligned with the long-term interests
of the corporation. Although climate risk is likely to affect companies
in the short-term, some of the most severe effects of climate change
will occur on a time horizon that is longer than the business cycles that
officers are traditionally accustomed to planning for.162 Also, because
executive compensation structures often reward short-term
improvements in shareholder value over long-term performance,163
managers may have implicit incentives to overlook information that
would lead to drops in stock prices.164 Managers who take steps to
improve a corporation’s long-term value by sacrificing short-term
161 See Madison Condon, Market

Myopia’s Climate Bubble, 2022 UTAH L. REV. 63, 67–
68, 122 (2021).
162 Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of England, Speech at the European Commission
Conference: A New Horizon (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/speech/2019/a-new-horizon-speech-by-mark-carney.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QN5R-TNY2] (“Climate risks also have a number of distinctive
elements, which, in combination, require a strategic approach. These include their . . .
[u]ncertain time horizon which may stretch beyond traditional business planning
cycles.”).
163 LUCIAN BEBCHUCK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock,
Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
1021, 1088 (2007).
164 Condon, supra note 161, at 84.
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profits could also be at risk of being ousted by dissatisfied short-term
shareholders, which may disincentivize a corporation’s officers from
pursuing climate risk mitigation strategies altogether.165 A 2005
survey of corporate executives found that eighty percent “felt pressure
to decrease spending in areas like research and development in order
to meet quarterly earnings targets.”166 Investments in climate risk
management may be comparable to research and development
investments in their long-term benefits and short-term costs, and may
be deprioritized in a similar manner.
In addition to the problem of information failure, cognitive
biases may prevent corporate officers and directors from
acknowledging the severity and seriousness of climate risk to their
corporation’s health and profitability.167 Behavioral economists have
identified several cognitive biases and common decision-making
patterns that might result in a systemic undervaluing of climate risk.
The availability heuristic predicts that individuals will prioritize risks
that can be recalled and irrationally discount low probability “black
swan” events if they have not occurred in the past.168 Even if general
climate risk is known, optimism bias predicts that individuals will
often assume that they, themselves, are less likely to experience the
most negative consequences of an event. As a result, managers may
focus their time and attention on best-case scenarios and underprepare
for the worst climate scenarios.169 Lastly, prospect theory suggests
that individuals put more weight on outcomes that are certain and less
weight on outcomes that are uncertain, discounting them by more than
the rational weighting of their probability of occurrence.170 Therefore,
“managers may overweight the costs of adaptation measures in the
present, which have a certain, known, price tag, and underweight

165

Despite the increasing prevalence of index funds and exchange traded funds, which
have incentives to promote long-term value, these diversified investors are usually less
likely to play an active role in governing individual companies than short-term
investors. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 863, 889–90 (2013).
166 Condon, supra note 161, at 85 n.123 (citing John R. Graham, Campbell Harvey &
Shiva Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 3, 32–35 (2005)).
167 Id. at 99–102.
168 Id. at 99.
169 Id. at 101 (citing Donald Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of
Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms),
146 U. PENN. L. REV. 101, 144 (1997)).
170 Id. (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979)).
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expected future climate damages whose magnitude and timing is more
uncertain.”171
These information failures and heuristics can explain how
corporations continue to provide insufficient climate risk information
despite rising investor pressure. They also suggest that insufficient
reporting can be overcome through improved mandatory disclosure
rules. Such disclosure could at least partially correct information
asymmetries between corporate managers and climate experts and
between managers and investors. It could also counteract cognitive
biases that prevent officers and directors from confronting their
companies’ climate risks.
B. SEC Non-Enforcement
Until recently, the SEC had done little to prompt corporations
to improve their climate risk disclosure. Trump-appointed SEC
Commissioner Hester Peirce has publicly characterized organizations’
calls for improved disclosure as a coordinated attempt at “public
shaming,” and a “brutish” effort by a “group of people who take the
lead in instigating their fellow citizens into a frenzy of moral
rectitude.”172 Former SEC Chairman Jay Clayton acknowledged the
reality of climate risk, but opposed petitions for rulemaking that would
standardize ESG disclosure, arguing that the flexibility of the existing
materiality standard is preferable.173 Even prior to Clayton’s tenure,
the Commission did not aggressively promote disclosure in
accordance with the 2010 Guidance. In 2010, the SEC’s Division of
Corporate Finance sent forty-nine “comment letters to companies
regarding the quality of their climate risk disclosure,” but only three

171

Id.
Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Scarlet Letters: Remarks Before
the American Enterprise Institute (June 18, 2019).
173 Donna Mussio, Mary Beth Houlihan & Taylor Souter, To Lead or Not to Lead:
Contrasting Recent Statements by SEC and ESMA Chairs on ESG Disclosure, HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOV.
(Mar.
16,
2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/16/to-lead-or-not-to-lead-contrasting-recentstatements-by-sec-and-esma-chairs-on-esg-disclosure/.
172
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were sent in 2012 and none were sent in 2013. 174 From 2016 to 2020,
a total of just six letters were issued.175
In addition to failing to push for improved climate disclosures
itself, the Commission hindered investors’ attempts to do so on their
own, actively intervening to block investor proposals related to
climate change, including climate disclosure proposals, from being
voted on in the proxy process.176 As a result, corporate managers had
little incentive to improve their disclosures.177
174

CERES, supra note 20, at 31. Comment letters are used by the SEC staff to promote
compliance where “the staff believes a company can significantly enhance its
compliance with the applicable requirements.” SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FILING REVIEW
PROCESS, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffilingreview.htm. These letters
might “request that a company provide supplemental information to help the staff better
understand the company’s disclosure, revise disclosure in a document on file with the
SEC, provide additional disclosure in a document on file with the SEC, or provide
additional or different disclosure in a future filing with the SEC.” Id.
175 CERES, supra note 20, at 31.
176 Madison Condon, Climate Change’s New Ally: Big Finance, BOSTON REV. (July 28,
2020),
http://bostonreview.net/science-nature/madison-condon-climatechange%E2%80%99s-new-ally-big-finance (citing David Hasemyer, Investors
Worried About Climate Change Run into New SEC Roadblocks, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS
(May 3, 2019)) [https://perma.cc/K9VL-D3PM]); see also Complaint at 9–10, Sierra
Club v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No. 4:19-cv-06971 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2019)
(seeking documents from SEC on increased use of no-action letters for climate-related
proposals). The SEC does this through “no-action” letters, which are issued in response
to requests for advice on whether an individual or entity’s activities would constitute a
violation of federal securities law and conclude that the SEC would not bring an
enforcement action against the entity for its conduct. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE
COMM’N, No Action Letters (Jan. 8, 2021) https://www.sec.gov/regulation/staffinterpretations/no-action-letters. Such letters may be sought when a company wants to
exclude a shareholder proposal from being voted on in the proxy process. See, e.g.,
Shareholder Proposal No-Action Responses Issued Under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/shareholderproposals-no-action [https://perma.cc/4D2V-9UGP]. In 2017, the SEC issued guidance
broadening its definition of “micromanagement,” a basis that can be used to exclude
shareholder proposals. See Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14I, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
(Nov.
1,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14i.htm
[https://perma.cc/US4Z-76NU]. The SEC subsequently granted its first no-action letter
allowing a corporation to exclude a proposal seeking adoption of an emissions targets.
See Amy Harder, Investors Stunned Over Oil Producer’s Climate-Change Exemption,
AXIOS (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.axios.com/oil-producers-climate-changeexemption-e3887656-42c0-4510-ad0d-6118cc3aef94.html.
177 Although the SEC is an independent agency, the Biden Administration’s clear focus
on climate risk is relevant. President Biden’s campaign climate plan endorsed
“requiring public companies to disclose climate risk and the greenhouse gas emissions
in their operations and supply chains,” The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution
and Environmental Justice, BIDEN HARRIS https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ (last
visited Feb. 1, 2021), and, in a January executive order, he called on the federal
government to “drive assessment, disclosure, and mitigation of climate pollution and
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Under the Biden Administration, however, the SEC has
signaled interest in both more vigorously enforcing disclosure under
the 2010 Guidance and promulgating new mandatory disclosure
regulations aimed specifically at climate risk. After Commissioner
Clayton’s resignation in December 2020, President Biden nominated
Gary Gensler, a supporter of improved climate risk disclosures, to
chair the SEC.178 Prior to Gensler’s confirmation, Commissioner
Allison Herren Lee, as Acting Chair, had already announced new
measures to enforce the 2010 Guidance on climate risk.179 With a
majority of Commissioners now in favor of stronger disclosures, it is
widely expected that the SEC will announce new climate risk
regulations in the early half of 2022.180
V.
THE BENEFITS OF IMPROVED DISCLOSURE FOR CORPORATIONS,
INVESTORS, MARKETS, AND SOCIETY
The prior Section provided several explanations for why
climate risk disclosure has not improved to a point where corporations
are providing comparable, specific, and decision-useful information.
Given these impediments to disclosure, some investors and regulators
have called for new rules that will require improved disclosure. As of
the time of this writing, 631 investors representing over $37 trillion in
assets had signed onto the Global Investor Statement to Governments
on Climate Change, calling for “reliable and decision-useful climaterelated financial information to price climate-related risks and
opportunities effectively” and asking global leaders to “implement the
TCFD recommendations into their jurisdictions, no later than

climate-related risks.” Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7622, § 201 (Jan. 27,
2021). Additionally, Acting SEC Chair Lee and Commissioner Crenshaw have
expressed strong support for climate-related disclosures, see infra note 182.
178 Katanga Johnson & Pete Schroeder, U.S. SEC Chair Tells Congress He Plans New
Rules on Climate Risk, Trading, REUTERS (May 7, 2021).
179
Allison Herren Lee, Cmmn’r, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Statement on the Review of
Climate-Related Disclosure (Feb. 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/NT2Q-EH4L.
180 See, e.g., Veronica E. Callahan, Ellen Kaye Fleishhacker, David F. Freeman, Jr.,
Brian D. Israel, Teresa L. Johnson, Michael D. Trager, Mark Epley, Daniel M. Hawke,
James Feeney, Sarah Grey, Amber A. Hay, Marne Marotta, Joshua R. Martin,
Stephanna F. Szotkowski, Erik Walsh & Charles Yi, A Rising Tide of Climate-Related
Disclosure Requirements? (ESG Advisory Series, Part 2), ARNOLD & PORTER (Mar. 9,
2021), https://perma.cc/B7NS-U27X.
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2020.”181 Regulators at the SEC182 and other U.S. federal agencies183
have increasingly become cognizant of growing climate risk and the
need for improved disclosures. International regulators too have taken
major steps to mandate climate risk disclosure.184
181

Global Investor Statement to Governments on Climate Change (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://perma.cc/8ZCP-C396. BlackRock has also joined calls for mandatory disclosure
rules. See Simon Jessopp & Matthew Green, BlackRock CEO Backs Mandatory Climate
Reporting, Urges U.S. Action, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/YDU4-S6J6;
see also Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2021 Letter to CEOs, BLACKROCK (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://perma.cc/F2HF-VZ7A (expressing strong support for a single reporting
standard, “which will enable investors to make more informed decisions about how to
achieve durable long-term returns”).
182 Acting Chair Lee and her Democratic colleagues have consistently criticized many
of the SEC’s recent regulatory actions, including amending Regulation S-K, for failing
to address climate risk in the process or undermining ESG disclosure more broadly.
See, e.g., Allison Herren Lee & Caroline A. Crenshaw, Comm’rs, Securities &
Exchange Comm’n, Joint Statement on Amendments to Regulations S-K:
Management’s Discussion and Analysis, Selected Financial Data, and Supplementary
Financial Information (Nov. 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/Y5N9-SS9C; Robert J.
Jackson & Allison Herren Lee, Comm’rs, Securities & Exchange Comm’n, Joint
Statement of Commissioners Robert J. Jackson, Jr. and Allison Herren Lee on Proposed
Changes to Regulation S-K (Aug. 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/AX46-ZXFN. She has
also argued that climate risk information has become as relevant to investor decisionmaking as traditional metrics, such as return on equity, or earnings volatility. Allison
Herren Lee, Big Business’s Undisclosed Climate Crisis Plans, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27,
2020), https://perma.cc/FTS3-EDUR.
In 2020, the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee made a formal recommendation that
the SEC find that ESG information is material and take action to incorporate ESG
disclosures into the disclosure regime. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N INVESTOR
ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SEC INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE
RELATING TO ESG DISCLOSURE (May 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/8HRK-DJXM.
183 See, e.g., CFTC REPORT, supra note 4, at i, 99–101; BD. OF GOVS. OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 58–59 (2020), https://perma.cc/95HG2NXS; BD. OF GOVS. OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SUPERVISION AND REGULATION
REPORT 26 (2020), https://perma.cc/8SV5-5K2E (recognizing climate risk in the
context of microprudental risk).
Indeed, the Federal Reserve’s joining the Network for Greening of the Financial
System, and the creation of a new Supervision Climate Committee signal a significant
shift in the U.S. central bank’s public messaging on how it views climate-related risks.
Press Release, Bd. of Govs. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Board Announces
It Has Formally Joined the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the
Financial System, or NGFS, as a Member (Dec. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/LBT53HYR; Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Kevin Stiroh to Step Down as Head
of New York Fed Supervision to Assume New System Leadership Role at Board of
Governors on Climate (Jan. 25, 2021), https://perma.cc/6NP5-7URN.
184 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. The EU is currently working on
amending or replacing its non-financial disclosure regime, with the European
Supervisory Authorities making clear that they favor mandatory, standardized reporting
requirements. Letter from European Banking Auth., European Insurance &
Occupational Pension Auth. & European Securities & Markets Auth., to Valdis
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Improving mandatory disclosure rules so that they elicit
comparable, specific, and decision-useful climate risk information
would provide benefits to companies, investors, and the broader
economy. As the previous sections demonstrated, neither existing SEC
requirements nor voluntary disclosure programs provide stakeholders
with the information necessary to properly price risk and make
investment decisions. Like risk disclosure generally, climate risk
disclosure is essential for price discovery and market functioning,
resulting in smarter investing and allocation of capital to higher-value
projects or corporations. The increased transparency enabled through
improved disclosure can also correct mispricing, resulting in informed
risk management strategies that would stabilize investor portfolios and
mitigate risks of a “climate bubble” akin to the housing bubble of the
late 2000s.185 Bringing the quality of climate risk disclosure level with
the quality of other forms of risk disclosure thus addresses financial
risk relevant to the SEC’s core mission and mandate.
A.

Benefits for Corporations

Section IV showed that managers and directors of companies
will often make decisions based on incomplete information and
imperfect heuristics about the risks that they face. Other structural
issues may additionally obstruct full and accurate accounting of risk.
Managers and directors may have, for example, short-term incentives
to boost quarterly earnings and share prices. Taken together, cognitive
biases and mismatched incentives can result in managers
underestimating or failing to foresee the risks that climate change
poses for the long-term fiscal well-being of their companies. This lack
of foresight will leave corporations unprepared to adapt to the rapidly
changing climate and the regulatory environment that comes with it.
Dombrovskis, Vice President, European Comm’n (June 11, 2020),
https://perma.cc/YX2R-QAJC.
185 A “climate bubble” is a hypothesized scenario in which companies facing substantial
climate risks are currently overvalued because markets are not properly considering
either the physical impacts or the transition costs associated with climate change.
Financial experts have raised concerns that economic shocks resulting from the sudden
and rapid deflation of that bubble could trigger a new financial crisis. Condon, supra
note 161, at 111–13. A related concept is the “carbon bubble,” in which fossil fuel assets
are overvalued because in the medium- and long-term the world will be drastically
reducing emissions and leaving reserves of fossil fuels unused. See Jean-Franscois
Mercure et al., Macroeconomic Impact of Stranded Fossil Fuel Assets, 8 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 588 (2018), https://perma.cc/7YWU-9ZG3; see also John R. Nolan,
Land Use and Climate Change Bubbles: Resilience, Retreat, and Due Diligence, 39
WILLIAM & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 321 (2015) (describing the consequences of
a coastal real estate bubble, in which flood-vulnerable properties see a sudden
depression of value due to rising insurance costs or stricter building codes).
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An improved mandatory disclosure regime that requires
corporations to share their climate risk assessments and plans may
thus help not only investors deciding how to allocate capital across
corporations but also the corporations themselves. Improved
mandatory disclosures could force corporations to engage in careful
and systematic analyses of their exposures to climate risk, preventing
them from ignoring worst-case scenarios or unfavorable information.
Improved disclosure conveys other benefits as well, including
improved information sharing, which may help companies in different
industries and geographic regions develop better strategies for climate
risk management—and enterprise risk management generally—as
well as more strategic investment and business model decisions.
The CFTC Report came to a similar conclusion, finding that
the benefits of improved disclosure for companies are three-fold: “the
improved ability: (i) to identify, assess, manage, and adapt to the
effects of climate change on operations, supply chains and customer
demand; (ii) to relay risk and opportunity information to capital
providers, investors, derivatives customers and counterparties,
markets, and regulators; and, (iii) to learn from competitors about
climate-related strategy and risk management best practices.”186
Comprehensive and comparable disclosure is therefore needed “to
inform [corporations’] strategic responses to climate risk by
benchmarking their performance against peer organizations.”187
Improved mandatory disclosure likely will also address a
collective action problem that exists among corporations competing
for investors. Currently, managers face strong short-term incentives to
keep share prices and credit ratings high, and as a result, have little
reason to disclose unfavorable climate risk information if it will lead
investors to favor competing corporations.188 However, because there
are benefits to sharing information and strategies for addressing
climate risk,189 corporations would be better off in a world where they
assess risks accurately and disclose this information so as long as they
have assurance that other corporations will do the same.190 An
improved mandatory disclosure regime solves this problem by

186

CFTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 87.
Id. at 91.
188 See supra Section IV.A. This is especially the case in a regulatory environment
where enforcement is unlikely.
189 CFTC REPORT, supra note 4.
190 Regulation is often used to address gamesmanship and to create a level playing field
wherein all regulated entities are assured that their competitors will be required to
comply with the same expectations. See CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 49–51 (1990).
187
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creating a level playing field. Corporate managers can benefit from
information sharing, while avoiding the penalties and backlash that
may have come with unilateral disclosure.191
B.

Benefits for Investors

The efficient capital markets hypothesis predicts that rational
investors who are aware of systemic errors in asset pricing will be able
to engage in arbitrage—exploiting mispricing, reaping a profit, and
bringing the value of the asset back in line with its fundamentals. But
“investors can only price the risks that they are aware of,”192 and
assessing the magnitude of an individual corporation’s climate risk
“requires more granular data than is currently disclosed in financial
reporting.”193 As a result, ninety-three percent of institutional investors
“view climate change as an investment risk that has yet to be priced in
by all the key financial markets globally.”194
Economic research bears out this widely held belief. In April
2020, the International Monetary Fund assessed the response of equity
markets to past extreme weather events and concluded that “climate
change physical risk does not appear to be reflected in global equity
valuations.”195 Other reports have similarly concluded that “investors
do not fully anticipate the economic repercussions of heat as a firstorder physical climate risk.”196 According to one study, a
corporation’s exposure to rising temperatures and extreme heat waves
reduced its revenues, and greater heat exposure resulted in a greater

191

Notably, however, the TCFD has noted that a 2019 survey found that a majority of
corporations believe there will be a first mover advantage to early disclosure in line
with its recommendations. TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES,
SOUTH POLE, DISCLOSING CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES:
ARE BUSINESSES READY FOR TCFD 4 (2019), https://perma.cc/6SMB-YEF5.
192 Condon, supra note 161, at 1.
193 Id. at 13.
194 BLOOMBERG, supra note 2.
195 INT’L MONETARY F UND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: M ARKETS IN THE
TIME OF COVID-19, at 85 (2020), https://perma.cc/F6YN-M2RX.
196
NORA M. C. PANKRATZ, ROB BAUER & JEROEN DERALL, CLIMATE CHANGE FIRM
PERFORMANCE,
AND
INVESTOR
SURPRISES
1
(Aug.
30,
2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3443146; cf. Tord Kjellstrom et
al., Working on a Warmer Planet: The Impact of Heat Stress on Labour Productivity
and Decent Work, INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 13 (2019),
https://perma.cc/7KGS-PEZA (“Projections based on a global temperature rise of 1.5°C
by the end of the twenty-first century . . . suggest that, in 2030, 2.2 percent of total
working hours worldwide will be lost to high temperatures—a productivity loss
equivalent to 80 million full-time jobs.”).
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deviation between analysts’ estimates and the corporation’s actual
financial performance.197
Asset-specific studies also offer a more detailed picture of
climate risk mispricing across different markets. In 2019, BlackRock
and Rhodium Group conducted an analysis of three asset types that
face substantial physical risks from climate change: municipal bonds,
commercial real estate, and electric utility equities. In the municipal
bond market, researchers discovered that “similar bonds located in
climate-sensitive and non-climate-sensitive areas . . . do not reveal
significant differences in valuation.”198 For commercial real estate,
researchers found that “FEMA flood maps understate true risks.” 199
And for electric utilities, researchers compiled geospatial data on the
location of every electrical power plant in the United States and used
historical data and modeling to assess the susceptibility of each of
these plants to physical risks such as hurricanes, flooding, and
droughts. Although some of the most climate-resilient utilities traded
at a slightly higher value, the majority of climate risk was still not
priced into the electricity market.200 Other research has found similar
evidence of mispricing in the agricultural market. One study compared
long-term drought forecasts across publicly traded food companies
and found that the market had failed to efficiently incorporate drought
impacts on profits into stock prices.201 Another adopted a climate-riskadjusted trading strategy for agricultural stocks based on the Actuaries
Climate Index and found positive returns over a one-year holding
period, again suggesting that the market was “inefficient toward
climate change risks.”202
Improved reporting is also useful for diversified investors,
who are generally less exposed to firm-specific risks. Due to the rise
of modern portfolio theory, institutional investors with broadly
diversified portfolios control a majority of the stock market.203 While
their diversification protects them from idiosyncratic, firm-specific,
197

Pankratz et al., supra note 196.
BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 11.
199 Id. at 3, 14; see also Jen Schwartz, National Flood Insurance Is Underwater Because
of Outdated Science, SCI. AM. (Mar. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/T4A5-WDLG.
200 BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 18.
201 Harrison G. Hong, Frank Weikai Li & Jiangmin Xu, Climate Risks and Market
Efficiency, 208 J. ECONOMETRICS 265-81 (2019).
202 RUIHONG JIANG & CHENGGUO WENG, CLIMATE CHANGE R ISK AND A GRICULTURERELATED
STOCKS
(Jan.
9,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3506311.
203 Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13–
14 (2020); see also Ann M. Lipton, Family Loyalty: Mutual Fund Voting and Fiduciary
Obligation, 19 TENN. J. BUS. L. 175 (2017).
198
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risks, they remain exposed to unhedgeable systematic risks, including
pervasive climate-related risks. And while most of these institutional
investor assets are held passively and not actively traded, improved
disclosure aids in shareholder governance and oversight of portfolio
companies.204 Because institutional investors retain large holdings in
many fossil-intensive corporations, they may use this oversight to
mitigate systematic climate risks directly through pressing for
emissions reductions.205
Lastly, mandatory climate risk disclosures would reduce the
prevalence (and the perceived prevalence) of “greenwashing,” a
phenomenon in which companies and investment funds overstate their
sustainability credentials in an effort to attract environmentally
conscious consumers and investors. Greenwashing is a clear problem
for misled investors and consumers, but it also disadvantages firms
and funds that have made actual commitments to environmental
responsibility and climate risk mitigation. These firms face
competition from greenwashed competitors—competitors that would
attract less attention in a market with more rigorous disclosures.
Moreover, fears of widespread greenwashing can be harmful for
companies, as consumer distrust weakens the demand even for
genuinely sustainable products and services.206 Improving the climate
risk reporting system and standardizing it across industries will help
ESG indexes monitor and differentiate companies (and, in turn, help
regulators monitor the decisions of index providers); as a result,
sustainability-minded investors will have better information about
corporations’ actual commitments to climate risk management.

204

Asset managers like BlackRock and pension funds like CalPERS have called for
improved climate risk disclosures that would allow for informed shareholder voting and
oversight. See Sustainable Investments Program: Climate Change, CalPERS (Dec. 31,
2019), https://perma.cc/4L67-CNSH; Fink, supra note 121.
205
Condon, supra note 203, at 88–95.
206 Sustainability and management scholars have warned that “if greenwashing
practices continue to go unchecked by regulation, it is possible that green consumers
will become increasingly cynical about green claims, eroding the market for green
products and services.” Magali A. Delmas & Vanessa Cuerel Burbano, The Drivers of
Greenwashing, 54 CAL. REV. MGMT. 64, 72 (2011), https://perma.cc/SKJ4-QXA4.
Additionally, “it is challenging for investors and funds following . . . environmental
assessment strategies to correctly assess firms on these dimensions when there is a lack
of verifiable information available to them. Just as rampant, unchecked greenwashing
could erode the consumer market . . . it could also erode the capital market for socially
responsible investing.” Id.
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C. Benefits for Markets
Disclosure is essential for allowing investors to make accurate
valuations of corporations, which in turn supports efficient allocation
of capital across industries and individual corporations. As the CFTC
Report explained, with sufficient disclosure, “[i]nvestors can better
assess a more refined measure of the long-term cost of capital, as well
as risks to firms, margins, cash flow and valuations.”207 When
companies properly disclose their risks, investors can reduce their own
uncertainty and stabilize the economy by diversifying their
portfolios.208
Without sufficient disclosure, widespread mispricing could
lead the economy towards a “climate bubble.” The market may
respond to mispricing with a slow adjustment as it gradually
incorporates accurate information about climate risk, or it may correct
prices suddenly, creating a significant shift in a short window of time.
Financial experts have expressed serious concerns about this latter
scenario, which creates a risk to the economic system itself. In 2016,
Mark Carney, then-Governor of the Bank of England, warned that
“sharp changes in valuations” of energy company equities could cause
a chain reaction throughout the financial sector.209 And in 2019, CFTC
Commissioner Rostin Behnam compared the financial risks of climate
change to the 2008 financial crisis.210
Some researchers have made attempts at modeling how the
economy will react to a bubble bursting, with a 2019 study warning
that global warming-induced reductions in labor productivity and
capital availability could lead to widespread defaults and declarations
of bankruptcy, destabilizing the global banking system and requiring
new bailouts.211 According to these researchers, taking measures to
rescue insolvent banks “will cause an additional fiscal burden of
approximately five to fifteen percent of gross domestic product per
year.”212 Based on this and other studies, the economic harms from

207

CFTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 87.
FRED WELLINGTON & AMANDADA SAUER, FRAMING CLIMATE RISK IN PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT 3 (2005), https://perma.cc/AG9G-KDG5.
209 Mark Carney, Gov., Bank of England, Chair, Fin. Stability Bd., Resolving the
Climate Paradox, Arthur Burns Memorial Lecture (Sept. 22, 2016),
https://perma.cc/6GPS-VWVU.
210 Behnam, supra note 3.
211 Francisco Lamperti et al., The Public Costs of Climate-Induced Financial Instability,
9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 829 (2019), https://perma.cc/39AU-9LKF.
212 Id. at 829; see also EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC RISK BOARD, TOO LATE, TOO SUDDEN:
TRANSITION TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY AND SYSTEMIC Risk (2016),
https://perma.cc/E9S3-T9EF.
208
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climate change will not just accrue to carbon-intensive industries and
their investors. Instead, sudden disruptions to asset prices could affect
the health of the entire economy as the shocks reverberate across the
market.
D.

Benefits for Society

In addition to the risk faced by private corporations and
investors, climate change also creates financial risk for the American
public at large. As the CFTC Report notes, if action is not taken to
mitigate climate change, its “impacts could impair the productive
capacity of the economy and undermine its ability to generate
employment, income, and opportunity.”213 Improved disclosure can
help prevent such results by allowing corporations and investors to
identify and manage climate risk and facilitate the orderly transition to
a low-carbon economy. Improved climate risk disclosure benefits
society not just by decreasing the likelihood of systemic financial
shock but also by furthering greenhouse gas mitigation efforts.
Economic research indicates that climate-related disclosures have
already resulted in reduced emissions: one study found that UKincorporated firms reduced their emissions by an average of fourteen
to eighteen percent after the government mandated that companies
disclose their emissions in 2013.214
Greenhouse gas mitigation, in turn, provides health and
welfare benefits to society by, for example, reducing the severity of air
pollution, the spread of infectious disease, the intensity of severe
weather events, and risks to the global food supply.215 Many climate
damages—including direct physical effects like flooding and heat
island effect, economic impacts from increased food and energy
prices, and human health impacts from respiratory illness and other
diseases—are disproportionately borne by low-income communities
and communities of color.216 By helping to reduce emissions,
213

CFTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 3.
Benedikt Downar et al., The Impact of Carbon Disclosure Mandates on Emissions
and Financial Operating Performance (2020), https://perma.cc/ET7A-52TV.
215 Megan Ceronsky & Peter Heisler, The Many Benefits of Reducing Carbon Pollution
from Existing Power Plants, ENV’TL DEF. FUND (May 15, 2014),
https://perma.cc/67CC-H9FW.
216 ILIANA PAUL ET. AL., INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE ANALYSIS: EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,898 AND CLIMATE CHANGE 6–7 (2021),
https://perma.cc/58A2-M477; see also Brad Plumer & Nadja Popovich, How Decades
of Racist Housing Policy Left Neighborhoods Sweltering, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://perma.cc/V4A9-2N7J; Sarah Mervosh, Unsafe to Stay, Unable to Go: Half a
Million Face Flooding Risk in Government Homes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2019),
https://perma.cc/PS2S-44KZ.
214
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improved disclosure can thus help lessen the burden of climate change
on the communities most vulnerable to its harms.217
******
Given these benefits, a growing number of investors and
regulators are calling for improved climate risk disclosures, which
would provide substantial benefits for corporations, investors,
markets, and society. But because neither existing legal requirements
nor voluntary disclosure programs have succeeded in eliciting
comparable, specific, and decision-useful disclosures, the SEC should
promulgate new disclosure regulations focused on the climate risk.
VI.
HOW THE SEC CAN SECURE IMPROVED DISCLOSURES
As prior sections of the Article have established, current
climate risk disclosure practices are not currently meeting the needs of
investors or other market actors. Although the SEC has taken steps to
strengthen its enforcement of the 2010 Guidance—for example,
through the issuance of comment letters to encourage better
reporting218—mere codification of the 2010 Guidance would not yield
sufficient disclosures. Rather, the SEC should promulgate more
detailed disclosure requirements that ensure investors receive
comparable, specific, and decision-useful information. This Section
proceeds in two parts. First, it provides an overview of the SEC’s legal
authority and how that authority relates to the benefits conveyed by
improved climate risk disclosure. Second, it suggests pathways by
which the SEC can coordinate with other organizations and leverage
its authority to create an improved disclosure system.
In order to develop a climate risk disclosure regime that
provides comparable, specific, and decision-useful information, the
SEC should engage staff, seek input from stakeholders, and draw from
other institutions’ best practices. Accordingly, this Article specifically

217

Disclosure of physical risk to corporate assets will also inform government efforts
to make infrastructure and other investments that safeguard marginalized communities
from further damage while spurring sustainable and resilient economic development.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 14,008, § 219 (Jan. 27, 2021) (instructing federal agencies to
develop “developing programs, policies, and activities to address the disproportionately
high and adverse human health, environmental, climate-related and other cumulative
impacts on disadvantaged communities, as well as the accompanying economic
challenges of such impacts”).
218 Michael Littenberg & Marc Rotter, SEC Highlighting the Need to Consider
Climate Change Disclosures in SEC Filings, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. (Oct.
24, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/10/24/sec-highlighting-the-need-toconsider-climate-change-disclosures-in-sec-filings/.
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recommends the SEC: (1) develop greater institutional expertise on
climate risk, improving its ability to set new standards and detect
omissions of material information; ; (2) coordinate regulatory actions
across agencies with the use of interagency working groups; and
(3) draw best practices from existing disclosure frameworks when
crafting improved mandatory disclosure rules.
A.
i.

An Overview of the SEC’s Authority

Setting Standards

Disclosure plays a central role in the SEC’s operations. The
SEC is authorized, under both the Securities Act and the Securities
and Exchange Act, to promulgate rules for disclosure “as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”219
In its 1996 revisions to the Securities Act, Congress added Section
2(b), which provides:
Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is
engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or
determine whether an action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall
also consider, in addition to the protection of investors,
whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.220
SEC rulemaking that ensures corporations make sufficient climate risk
disclosures would further each of these goals of investor protection,
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
a. Investor Protection
Sections II and III.C of this Article identified how climate risk
is material to investor decision-making and how current disclosure

219

Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, Release No. 3310064, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,915, 23,969-73 (Apr. 13, 2016) (citing Sections 7, 10, and 19(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g(a)(10), 77j, and 77s(a); and Sections
3(b), 12, 13, 14, 15(d), and 23(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(b),
78l, 78m(a), 78n(a), 78o(d), and 78w(a)).
While this statutory delegation of authority appears broad, the SEC has limited itself by
interpreting its authority as cabined by its “core mission to promote investor protection,
market efficiency and competition, and capital formation.” Harper Ho, supra note 87,
at 340-41 (citing Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K:
Concept Release, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,917, 23,922 & n.6 & n.55 (Apr. 22, 2016)).
220 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3425 (adding 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) to the Securities Act of 1933 and 15 U.S.C. §
78c(f) to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
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systems are inadequate, leading to significant and widespread
mispricing. Under the status quo, investors may be unaware of the
physical and transition risks the corporations they invest in face and
the implications of that exposure. Further, many of these risks affect
entire markets and industries, making them harder to diversify away.
Such non-diversifiable risk may necessitate greater investor
protection.221 An improved mandatory climate risk disclosure regime
protects investors by preventing corporations from withholding
material information that could affect an investor’s expected returns.
b. The Public Interest: Efficiency, Competition, and Capital
Formation
Section V.C showed how remedying mispricing also furthers
the economy-wide goal of allocative efficiency, as prices that
incorporate all available information about a corporation’s financial
prospects improve investors’ ability to distribute capital to its highestvalue use. In addition to furthering allocative efficiency, an improved
climate risk disclosure regime would promote U.S. competitiveness
and capital formation by increasing investor confidence. As an SEC
petition for rulemaking observed:
Many other developed countries have already
promulgated [environmental, social, and corporate
governance disclosure] requirements, shaping the
expectations of global investors. . . . To the extent that
US companies fail to disclose information which
global investors are being encouraged, and in some
cases required, to consider, they will be at a
disadvantage in attracting capital from some of the
world’s largest financial markets.222
As discussed above, many investors perceive current voluntary
disclosures to be “highly uneven” as a result of the general lack of
oversight or auditing from independent organizations.223 Without an
improved mandatory regime, U.S. companies that voluntarily disclose
their climate risk in accordance with best practices may still have a
comparatively hard time attracting capital because investors lack
assurances that the voluntary disclosures are trustworthy. Increasing
investor confidence in climate risk disclosures “may well mobilize
221

See TCFD REPORT, supra note 9, at 34.
Cynthia A. Williams & Jill E. Fisch, Request for Rulemaking on Environmental,
Social, and Governance, 3–6 (Oct. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/NDW4-3NW9.
223 BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 144.
222
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sources of capital from investors who are currently unwilling to invest
given knowledge gaps or information symmetries.”224
The SEC thus has clear legal authority under its enabling
statutes to engage in rulemakings that set improved mandatory
standards for climate risk disclosure. Such regulations would protect
investors and further the public interest in allocative efficiency,
international competitiveness, and capital formation.
ii.

Initiating and Conducting Economic Research

In addition to promulgating and enforcing regulations for the
securities industry, the SEC has the authority to conduct its own
research on market risks and financial trends. The SEC’s Division of
Economic and Risk Analysis (“DERA”) serves as the SEC’s “think
tank,” and is tasked with “facilitat[ing] capital formation through
sound economic analysis and rigorous data analytics.”225 DERA
participates in all of the activities of the SEC, including rulemaking
and enforcement; its duties include “identifying and analyzing issues,
trends, and innovations in the marketplace” and “working with outside
experts in academia and industry to strengthen the Commission’s
foundation of market knowledge.”226
DERA also plays an important role in facilitating standardized
disclosure and detecting violations of securities law. Within DERA,
the Office of Structured Disclosure “works . . . to design data
structuring approaches for required disclosures . . . and works with
investors, regulated entities, and the public to support the submission
and use of structured data.”227 Additionally, DERA’s Office of Risk
Assessments and Office of Data Science facilitates the efficient
enforcement of federal securities law by “developing customized,
analytic tools and analyses to proactively detect market risks
indicative of possible violations.”228
B.

Recommended SEC Actions to Improve Climate Risk Disclosure

Drawing on the authorities discussed above, the SEC should
issue new regulations that specifically require disclosure of climate
risk. Rulemakings as contemplated here should build on the
224

Williams & Fisch, supra note 222, at 5.
About the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE
COMM’N, https://perma.cc/6SGB-6PRN (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
226 Id.
227
Office of Structured Disclosure, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N,
https://perma.cc/S25E-R77F (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
228 SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N, supra note 225.
225
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requirements of Regulation S-K to further standardize climate risk
disclosure and resolve any interpretive ambiguities left by the 2010
Guidance. To ensure that these regulations elicit disclosures that are
comparable, specific, and decision-useful, the Commission should
take the following procedural steps. First, at the staff level, the
Commission should develop greater institutional expertise on climate
risk, improving its ability to set new standards and detect omissions of
material information. . Second, the Commission ought to coordinate
its regulatory actions with other financial regulators and agencies with
climate expertise. Third, in crafting its new disclosure requirements,
the SEC should draw on best practices from voluntary and foreign
disclosure regimes.
i. Recommendation 1: Develop Institutional Expertise on Climate
Risk
As an initial matter, the SEC should take steps to improve its
institutional expertise on climate risk.229 As previously noted, the lack
of subject-matter expertise has hampered the agency’s enforcement
efforts. The SEC should thus hire advisors with expertise on climate
risk to guide the agency through the regulatory process and to
spearhead relevant research projects.230 The Commission could also
rely on DERA to conduct economic analyses of the impacts of climate
risk on financial markets, and integrate DERA’s findings into the
SEC’s policymaking, rulemaking, and enforcement operations.
Securities regulators in other countries have undertaken
similar research projects. The Bank of England’s Prudential
Regulation Authority (“PRA”) has published reports on the impacts of
climate change on PRA-regulated banks, as well as analyses of how
banks have responded to climate risk.231 The Canadian Securities
Administrators has also issued a report on the state of climate risk
disclosures, and plans to use those findings to develop “guidance and
educational initiatives which are useful to issuers across a wide range
229

This should also be done in coordination with other U.S. financial regulators and
particularly in collaboration with the Financial Stability Oversight Council, as
discussed below.
230 The SEC has already begun taking this step, announcing the hiring of a Senior Policy
Advisor for Climate and ESG. Press Release, Securities & Exchange Comm’n, Satyam
Khanna Named Senior Policy Advisor for Climate and ESG (Feb. 1, 2021),
https://perma.cc/6ZP7-ED4P.
231 See, e.g., BANK OF ENGLAND PRUDENTIAL REG. AUTH., TRANSITION IN THINKING:
THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UK BANKING SECTOR (2018),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudentialregulation/report/transition-in-thinking-the-impact-of-climate-change-on-the-ukbanking-sector.pdf.
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of industries with respect to the business risks and opportunities and
potential financial impacts of climate change,” and to consider “new
disclosure requirements regarding corporate governance in relation to
business risks, including climate change-related risks, and risk
oversight and management.”232
SEC-directed research into climate risk would help the agency
make informed, evidence-based decisions as it establishes new
policies and rules. This knowledge would additionally help the SEC
set priorities as it considers which industries are most urgently in need
of improved climate risk disclosure and how best to regulate and
structure disclosures. Sustainability reporting organizations, think
tanks, scholars, and advocacy groups have already made important
contributions to these subjects, and the SEC should not hesitate to
leverage this valuable research.233 By centralizing and building on this
body of knowledge through DERA, the SEC can identify which of its
disclosure regulations are most effective, anticipate new trends in the
marketplace, and find solutions to regulatory challenges as they arise.
Research on the current state of climate risk disclosure is also
useful to SEC regulatory enforcement. As discussed in Section IV.B,
from 2016 to 2020, the SEC did not engage in a serious effort to
enforce its 2010 Climate Disclosure Guidance, issuing only six
comment letters to companies regarding the sufficiency and accuracy
of their climate risk disclosures.234 This trend toward non-enforcement
seems poised for change with the arrival of a new presidential
administration and commissioners, but growth in the SEC’s
institutional expertise on climate change would also greatly enhance
its ability to detect when companies have reported implausible or
misleading estimates of their risk exposure. This increased threat of

232

CANADIAN SECURITIES ADMIN., CSA STAFF NOTICE 51-354, REPORT ON CLIMATE
CHANGE-RELATED DISCLOSURE PROJECT, at 3 (Apr. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/K2JEXUYU.
233 Scholarly work on climate risk disclosure and proposals to improve disclosure both
span decades. See generally, e.g., Jeffrey M. McFarland, Warming Up to Climate
Change Risk Disclosure, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 281 (2009); Natalie Nowiski,
Rising Above the Storm: Climate Risk Disclosure and Its Current and Future Relevance
to the Energy Sector, 39 ENERGY L.J. 1 (2018); Kevin L. Doran & Elias L. Quinn,
Climate Change Risk Disclosure: A Sector by Sector Analysis of SEC 10-K Filings from
1995-2008, 34 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 721 (2009); Melissa K. Scanlan, Climate
Risk Is Investment Risk, 35 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 18 (2020); Constance Wagner,
Corporate Environmental Reporting and Climate Change Risk: The Need for Reform
of Securities and Exchange Commission Disclosure Rules, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J.
BUS. L. 151 (2009).
234 CERES, supra note 20, at 31 (citing Andy Green & Andrew Schwartz, Corporate
Long-Termism, Transparency, and the Public Interest, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct.
2, 2018), https://perma.cc/3QVX-S2TY).
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detection and enforcement would, in turn, incentivize corporations to
share accurate information with the public. In particular, DERA’s
Offices of Risk Assessment and Data Science would be well suited to
develop analytic tools analogous to those it already employs to detect
violations of other securities laws.235 These tools, when applied to a
standardized and improved disclosure regime, could greatly reduce the
cost of enforcement for the SEC.
ii. Recommendation 2: Coordinate Regulatory Actions Across
Agencies
While this Article focuses on the SEC, it is only one of several
agencies across the federal government with regulatory authority
relevant to climate risk disclosure. Other agencies—such as the CFTC,
the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency—share
financial oversight authority with the SEC, regulating financial
markets, banks, investment companies, and other broker-dealers.236
Additionally, while the SEC is well positioned to develop expertise on
some issues—such as the types of financial risk that particular
changes in climate conditions could pose to particular industries—
other agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”)
have superior institutional knowledge on the extent to which the
climate can be expected to change in a given time period.
Therefore, it is important that the SEC coordinate with other
agencies both to leverage their expertise and to ensure consistency
across distinct but overlapping regulatory regimes.237 The SEC should
explore ways to coordinate with relevant federal agencies through, for
example, an Interagency Working Group (“IWGs”). IWGs, convened
by executive order or using other source of authority, have been
deployed successfully in other regulatory contexts to address technical
issues that require a unified regulatory approach.238 For example, after
235

See supra note 228.
CERES, supra note 20, at 15.
237 The SEC should likewise consider working with international regulators. In a
January executive order, President Biden directed the Secretary of the Treasury to
“ensure that the United States is present and engaged in relevant international fora and
institutions that are working on the management of climate-related financial risks,”
Exec. Order No. 14,008, § 102(g)(i) (Jan. 27, 2021), but the Commission should also
coordinate and learn from international endeavors.
238 Notably, interagency working groups are generally not convened by individual
executive agencies, but are established through Presidential executive orders. See, e.g.,
236
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Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic and
Safety Administration, a case in which the Ninth Circuit remanded a
set of corporate average fuel economy standards due to the agency’s
failure to account for the value of reducing greenhouse gas emissions
when determining the standards’ stringency.239 This coordination
effort could also occur through an IWG or other mechanism convened
by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”),240 a
collaborative body consisting of each of the federal financial
regulators and charged with facilitating regulatory coordination.241
One issue for which an IWG or other coordinating mechanism
may prove particularly useful is climate scenario analysis. The TCFD
recommends that corporations engage in climate scenario analysis, but
research by the Institute for Climate Economics indicates that very
few companies actually engage in such analysis, and the companies
that do vary widely in their assumptions, modeling techniques, and
approaches.242 Many corporations, express confusion as to how
climate scenarios should be understood and used.243 The SEC could
improve on the TCFD recommendations by providing more detailed
guidance on how scenario analyses should be conducted,

Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 1-102 (1994) (creating interagency working group on
environmental justice); Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 4(d) (1993) (providing authority for
regulatory working group that coordinated efforts to set a consistent social cost of
carbon); Exec. Order No. 13,439, § 1 (2007) (convening interagency working group on
import safety).
239
538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008).
240 FSOC has created interagency working groups previously, for example, convening
a IWG on hedge funds in 2016 to better understand their activities and assess their
potential risk to financial stability. Press Release, Dep’t of Treasury, Financial Stability
Oversight Council Releases Statement on Review of Asset Management Products and
Activities (Apr. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/M9T9-M9J5.
241 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 111, 12 U.S.C. §
5322(a)(2)(E). FSOC was created by the Dodd Frank Act for three primary purposes:
identifying risk to financial stability; promoting market discipline; responding to
emerging risks to stability. Id. § 5322(a)(1). FSOC is chaired by the Secretary of
Treasury, and has nine other voting members including the heads of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the SEC, the FDIC, the CFTC,
the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the National Credit Union Administration, and
one independent member with insurance expertise appointed by the President. About
FSOC, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://perma.cc/HVK9-AEJV (last visited Feb. 1,
2021). In October 2021, FSOC released a report identifying climate risk as a threat to
financial stability. FSOC, REPORT ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL RISK (2021),
https://perma.cc/P5NR-KS5F.
242 CHARLOTTE V AILLES & CLÉMENT MÉTIVIER, INST. FOR CLIMATE ECONOMICS, VERY
FEW COMPANIES MAKE GOOD USE OF SCENARIOS TO ANTICIPATE THEIR CLIMATECONSTRAINED FUTURE (2019), https://perma.cc/YXF7-QNWJ.
243 Id.
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standardizing which scenario (or menu of scenarios) corporations
should consider, or mandating fuller disclosure of the assumptions
underlying the company’s chosen scenario(s) and the results of its
analyses. However, other U.S. regulators, such as the Federal Reserve,
have expressed interest in using scenario analysis to assess the
resilience of the financial system and the economy to climate risk.244
Additionally, NOAA and EPA have relevant expertise on climate
modeling techniques and may be better positioned to determine which
warming scenarios are most useful to consider, which modeling
assumptions are most reasonable, and how to translate projected
physical impacts into economic impacts that can be integrated into
financial models.245 Using an IWG to address these questions could
help the SEC and the Federal Reserve (and other financial regulators)
craft their scenario-analysis requirements more efficiently and ensure
that the requirements do not conflict.
iii. Recommendation 3: Draw Best Practices from Existing
Frameworks and Standards
Lastly, the SEC’s new disclosure regulations should draw
from best practices established by voluntary disclosure programs and
disclosure regimes in other countries, which are the product of years
of research and practitioner input and are thus highly reflective of the
needs of both users and preparers of disclosures. Specifically, the
Commission should look to the TCFD framework and the SASB
standards when determining which standards and metrics should apply
to a given industry. SASB’s focus on creating standards that are
maximally useful for investors makes it a particularly valuable
resource for the SEC. A rulemaking consistent with the existing TCFD
framework and SASB standards would also decrease the compliance
costs for companies that are already voluntarily disclosing climate risk
under these regimes.
Additionally, because other countries have begun to structure
their disclosure regimes based on the TCFD framework, adopting a
similar approach in the United States could decrease corporations’
Lael Brainard, Gov’r, Bd. of Gov’rs of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Strengthening the
Financial System to Meet the Challenge of Climate Change (Dec. 18, 2020),
https://perma.cc/K965-2LP4. Other central banks, like the Bank of England, have
likewise expressed interest in scenario analysis. See, e.g., Press Release, Bank of
England, The Bank of England Is Restarting the Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario
(CBES) (Nov. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/8W28-G5WX.
245 See generally Tanya Fiedler et al., Business Risk and the Emergence of Climate
Analytics, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE (2021), https://perma.cc/WSB7-QFM5
(discussing use of climate models in financial risk assessment).
244
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cost of compliance and improve their ability to attract capital from
foreign investors seeking comparable information. The European
Union, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand have all initiated
regulatory actions to mandate climate risk disclosure, and all three
have used the TCFD as a starting point for their respective disclosure
frameworks.246 The UK Financial Reporting Council has also
encouraged companies to disclose using SASB metrics.247
A robust climate risk disclosure framework would likely
contain several key elements: (1) a series of broadly applicable
disclosures for all registrants, similar to the TCFD requirements; (2) a
number of universal line-item disclosures that would provide all
investors with comparable information; and (3) a series of industryspecific metrics and standards that address climate issues material to
particular industries, similar to the SASB framework. The TCFD
provides a common core of disclosures that are relevant to all
companies, but its standards, which are broadly worded, may not by
themselves elicit comparable disclosure.248 Therefore, a series of more
concrete line items and metrics will be helpful to ensure that
disclosures are maximally comparable, specific, and decision-useful
for investors. Universal line-items may include, for example,
materially relevant state and federal climate legislation and regulation,
or the total value of fossil fuel-related assets owned or managed by the
registrant. Both of these line items would be relevant to understanding
the transition-related risks associated with any registrant’s business.
This is not to say, however, that the SEC’s new disclosure
regulations should merely codify the TCFD framework and SASB
standards. The Commission should also rely on its own economic
246

See Frances Schwartzkopff, EU Wants Tougher Climate Disclosure Rule as Firms
Lag
Behind,
BLOOMBERG
(Apr.
21,
2021),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-21/eu-wants-tougher-climatedisclosure-rules-as-firms-lag-behind; Vanessa Havard-Williams et al., UK Paves Way
for Mandatory TCFD Climate Disclosure for Companies and Other Organisations by
2025,
LINKLATERS
(Nov.
12,
2020)
https://www.linklaters.com/en/insights/blogs/sustainable-futures/2020/november/ukpaves-way-for-mandatory-tcfd-climate-disclosure-for-companies-and-otherorganisations-by-2025; NZ Ministry for the Env’t, Mandatory Climate Related
Disclosures (Apr. 2021), https://environment.govt.nz/what-government-is-doing/areasof-work/climate-change/mandatory-climate-related-financial-disclosures/.
247
Havard-Williams et al., supra note 251.
248 The eleven TCFD recommendations include a mix of line-item disclosures and
broader, principles-based disclosures. For example, in the “Metrics and Targets”
section, the TCFD recommends that registrants disclose Scope 1,2, and 3 greenhouse
gas emissions, and that registrants “describe the targets used by the organization to
manage climate-related risks and opportunities.” The first recommendation, as a
numeric metric of climate risk exposure, is more likely to elicit comparable information
across corporations than the second.
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research, work done by international counterparts, and
recommendations from other sustainability reporting organizations
and climate change experts, and it should deviate from TCFD and
SASB requirements where it finds that an alternative approach to
disclosure would yield superior results. Still, using these two
voluntary programs as a basis point for regulation will allow the
agency to take advantage of years of research on best practices for
climate risk disclosure.249
VII.
CONCLUSION
Climate change is ushering in a new set of challenges and
opportunities for corporations and their investors. Climate risk
disclosure has not kept pace, as current regulatory rules and voluntary
regimes do not provide investors and other financial stakeholders
access to comparable, specific, and decision-useful information.
Without proper disclosure of climate-related financial risks and the
strategies undertaken to manage those risks, creditors and shareholders
lack the information necessary to price assets correctly, jeopardizing
economic stability. These problems have led financial experts and
institutional investors to call for an improved mandatory climate risk
disclosure regime with standardized reporting requirements.
The SEC should respond to these growing demands with new
rulemakings that would set mandatory climate risk disclosure
requirements for public companies. In order to ensure that disclosures
are maximally useful, the SEC should coordinate with other agencies

249

An improved climate risk disclosure regime should be comprised of industryspecific reporting requirements, and the SEC should consider building these reporting
requirements through an iterative approach to sector-specific rulemaking or guidance.
Under an iterative approach, the SEC would establish a disclosure regime that could be
revised and expanded over time. This process could begin with an initial rulemaking
that enacts improved reporting requirements that are (1) widely agreed upon to be
decision-useful for investors, and (2) applicable across all industries. For example, the
TCFD recommends that all companies engage in scenario analysis, which asks
corporations to assess the resilience of their business strategies against a range of
warming scenarios and the associated physical and transition risk. As the TCFD
explains, scenario analysis is useful for investors and corporations across all industries
because it “clarifies the predictable and uncertain elements in different futures,” and
encourages the development of alternative strategies that could bolster a corporation’s
resilience. TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, GUIDANCE ON
SCENARIO
ANALYSIS
FOR
NON-FINANCIAL
COMPANIES
1
(2020),
https://perma.cc/BL4V-227L. The SEC could then promulgate industry-specific
requirements, similar to SASB’s standards, and consider prioritizing disclosure
rulemakings for industries that are most broadly exposed to climate risk—industries
such as energy, agriculture, clothing, and real estate.
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through interagency working groups and solicit input from financial
and climate experts, investors, and voluntary reporting organizations.
Additionally, the SEC should develop its own institutional expertise
on climate risk by conducting economic research on climate risk
through DERA. Taken together, these actions will facilitate informed
investing, sustainable growth, and a more resilient economy.
This Article has refrained from specifying the ideal substance
of new disclosure rules, focusing instead on process-oriented
recommendations. More research and advocacy should, however, be
dedicated to the substantive questions that the SEC will confront in
crafting an improved disclosure regime. Among myriad other
considerations, such questions include the desirability of standardizing
climate scenarios, designating an authoritative source for climate
information, setting relevant time horizons, or establishing assurance
requirements in conjunction with the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board. The process-oriented recommendations made herein
will put the SEC in a better position to consider these substantive
issues and craft disclosure rules that elicit comparable, specific, and
decision-useful information.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931076

